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LIMITS ON INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
UNDER THE ADA:
RETHINKING THE STANDING RULE
FOR DEAF PATIENTS
IN THE MEDICAL SETTING
MICHAEL A. SCHWARTZ*
ABSTRACT
Deaf patients face difficult attitudinal and communication barriers in the
medical setting. Although the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) entitles them
to effective communication via appropriate auxiliary aids, these patients are often
frustrated by medical providers who do not understand either their patients'
communication needs or the provider's own obligation under the law to provide
effective communication. Deaf patients are then challenged by the law of standing
that deprives them of their day in court. Because many, if not most, Deaf patients
decide to go elsewhere when confronted by a medical provider's refusal to provide
auxiliary aids, courts have ruled these patients have presented no case or
controversy for adjudication. In this article, Professor Schwartz looks at research
data that highlights the difficulties Deaf patients face in the medical setting and the
legal paradigm that was established by the ADA to confront and resolve these
difficulties. The article then examines how the lack of imminent future injury
operates to bar standing where a plaintiff does not return to the provider's office.
The article concludes that Deaf patients' intent to return should not be controlling;
the lack of accessibility establishes an actual and present injury for these patient-
plaintiffs, not a future imminent one, which ought to confer standing. Moreover,
the medical provider's refusal ought to establish the likelihood of a continuing
refusal in violation of the ADA. Professor Schwartz concludes with a proposal: the
allocation of the burden of proof should operate to establish a rebuttable
presumption that the defendant's refusal to provide appropriate auxiliary aids
represents an ongoing violation of law, which confers standing on the plaintiff
regardless of the plaintiffs intention to return to the defendant.
Copyright © 2008 by Michael A. Schwartz.
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INTRODUCTION
Deaf patients have a difficult time persuading medical providers to furnish
sign language interpreters as an appropriate auxiliary aid in the medical setting.,
When these patients launch a lawsuit against a provider for injunctive relief under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),2 their boat runs aground on the shoal
of standing.3 Pursuant to the Supreme Court's reading of Article III's requirement
of a "case or controversy," 4 the federal courts have interpreted standing to bar Deaf
plaintiffs from proceeding for an injunction in a number of key cases. 5 This article
1. See, e.g., Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No. 95 CV 4549 SJ., 2007 WL 805802, at * 1,
*3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2007); Connors v. W. Orange Healthcare Dist., No. 605CV647ORL3 I KRS, 2005
WL 1500899, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2005); Constance v. State Univ. N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr., 166 F.
Supp. 2d 663, 664 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Majocha v. Turner, 166 F. Supp. 2d 316, 318-19 (W.D. Pa. 2001);
Freydel v. N.Y. Hosp., No. 97 Civ. 7926 (SHS), 2000 WL 10264, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2000), aff'd,
242 F.3d 365, No. 00-7108, 2000 WL 1836755 (2d Cir. Dec. 13, 2000); Bravin v. Mount Sinai Med.
Ctr, 186 F.R.D. 293, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 780 (S.D. Ohio,
1999); Falls v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., No. Civ. A.97-1545, 1999 WL 33485550, at *1 (D. Md.
March 16, 1999); Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 821 (D. Md. 1998);
Naiman v. N.Y. Univ., No. 95 CIV. 6469 (LMM), 1997 WL 249970, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1997);
Schroedel v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 885 F. Supp. 594, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); People ex rel. Vacco v. Mid
Hudson Med. Group, 877 F. Supp. 143, 144-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F.
Supp. 1329, 1332 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (E.D. Mich.
1994). The narratives in these cases involve one or more Deaf people dealing with an inaccessible health
care system because a sign language interpreter was unavailable to facilitate communication between the
Deaf person (whether a patient or a relative) and medical personnel. The Mid Hudson case represented
an egregious situation where the medical clinic insisted that the Deaf patient, who was also legally blind,
read lips and write notes. Mid Hudson Med. Group, 877 F. Supp. at 145.
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
3. See Constance, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 667; Freydel, 2000 WL 10264, at *3; Bravin, 186 F.R.D. at
299; Naiman, 1997 WL 249970, at *5; Schroedel, 885 F. Supp. at 599; Aikins, 843 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
Standing concerns whether "a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to
obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). In the
above-listed cases, the courts generally held that because Deaf plaintiffs would not, or were not able to,
return to the medical provider, or because there was little likelihood they would return, there was no
case or controversy for resolution. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
4. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 1. To satisfy Article Ill's demand for a case or controversy that
would support judicial intervention, the plaintiff must establish an injury in fact fairly traceable to the
defendant's conduct that can be redressed by a court order. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United For Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982).
5. See Constance, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 667; Freydel, 2000 WL 10264, at *3-4; Bravin, 186 F.R.D.
at 299; Nainan, 1997 WL 249970, at *5; Schroedel, 885 F. Supp. at 599; Aikins, 843 F. Supp. at 1333-
34. The problem confronting Deaf patient-plaintiffs is that the denial of appropriate auxiliary aids
constitutes harm that is completed, and when the plaintiff demands an order to provide the auxiliary aids
in the future, the question before the court is whether the plaintiff has shown a sufficient threat-
"certainly impending"--of actual injury. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1988) ("Each of
these cases demonstrates what we have said many times before and reiterate today: Allegations of
possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements for Art. Ill. A threatened injury must be 'certainly
impending' to constitute injury in fact.").
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constructs an argument for why, when a Deaf plaintiff seeks injunctive relief
against a doctor or hospital to compel the provision of a sign language interpreter,
standing should be construed liberally to allow the lawsuit to go forward even when
the plaintiff will not or is not able to return to the doctor or hospital.6
I. THE QUANDARY CONFRONTING DEAF PATIENTS
Despite the fact that up to two million Deaf Americans communicate using
American Sign Language (ASL),7 the overwhelming majority of doctors in
America do not sign.8 There is significant variation in Deaf people's abilities not
only in speaking and reading lips, but also in reading and writing English fluently.
9
Most medical personnel know little about Deafness, Deaf culture, and the myriad
ways in which Deaf people communicate.' Thus, an inaccessible medical office is
6. 1 choose the convention of capitalizing the word, "Deaf," to underline the political act of
naming: to be "Deaf' is to claim membership in a cultural and linguistic minority as opposed to the
popular idea of "deafness" as a medical condition. CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, INSIDE DEAF
CULTURE 1 (2005); Steven Barnett, Cross-Cultural Communication With Patients Who Use American
Sign Language, 34 FAM. MED. 376, 377 (2002) [hereinafter Barnett, Cross-Cultural Communication];
Steven Barnett, Clinical and Cultural Issues in Caring for Deaf People, 31 FAM. MED. 17, 18 (1999)
[hereinafter Barnett, Clinical and Cultural Issues]; Todd N. Witte & Anton J. Kuzel, Elderly Deaf
Patients' Health Care Experiences, 13 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 17, 17 (2000). The authors of an
important book on Deafness follow this convention throughout the book. HARLAN LANE ET AL., A
JOURNEY INTO THE DEAF WORLD, at x (1996).
7. LANE ET AL., supra note 6, at 42. Hearing impairment, with a prevalence of 9.35 percent, is the
sixth most common "chronic condition" in the "civilian, noninstitutionalized U.S. population." Steven
Barnett & Peter Franks, Health Care Utilization and Adults Who Are Deaf: Relationship with Age at
Onset of Deafness, 37 HEALTH SERV. RES. 103, 103 (2002); JOHN GARY COLLINS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS: PREVALENCE OF SELECTED CHRONIC
CONDITIONS: UNITED STATES, 1990-92, at 9-10 (1997), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr-10/srl 01 94.pdf.
8. Alice Nemon, Deaf Persons and Their Doctors, 14 J. REHABILITATION DEAF 19, 19 (1980).
There is at least one hearing doctor in Rochester who is fluent in sign language, and while one can find
evidence of a medical clinic that highlights its communication accessibility to Deaf patients, see, e.g.,
Sinai, Deaf Access Program, http://www.sinai.org/services/Deaf-access/deaf-access.asp (last visited
Apr. 4, 2008), these are very far and few in between. The literature on communication between a Deaf
patient and doctor assumes a signing patient and a non-signing doctor. See, e.g., Steven Barnett,
Communication with Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing People: A Guide for Medical Education, 77 ACAD.
MED. 694, 697 (2002); Annie G. Steinberg et al., Deaf Women: Experiences and Perceptions of
Healthcare System Access, 11 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH 729, 730-35 (2002).
9. Patricia Golden & Marian Ulrich, Deaf Patients' Access to Care Depends on Staff
Communication, 52 HOSPITALS 86, 86 (1978); Lisa M. Harmer, Health Care Delivery and Deaf People:
Practice, Problems, and Recommendations for Change, 4 J. DEAF STUD. & DEAF EDUC. 73, 80-81
(1999) (describing the problems with educating Deaf students in mainstream schools and the resulting
levels of education gained); see also Michele LaVigne & McCay Vernon, An Interpreter Isn't Enough:
Deafness, Language, and Due Process, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 843, 851-52 (2003) (explaining the various
levels of language proficiency in Deaf culture).
10. Golden & Ulrich, supra note 9, at 86.
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an ontological reality for many Deaf patients.'' Because of limited access to health
information, many Deaf people are unable to make informed health care decisions
for themselves and their families.' 2 The major barriers are attitudinal and
communication-related. 13
A. Attitudinal Barriers
The medical setting is a site of power, coloring the relationship between
medical personnel and people with disabilities. 14 While this insight is valid for
everyone, disabled or not, the disparity is particularly acute for Deaf patients whose
expressive and receptive language skills do not conform to the norm of spoken and
written English. Accordingly, the doctor's exercise of power and authority over
Deaf patients is more hierarchical and unequal than the power exercised over
people who are not Deaf: "[The doctor-patient relationship] is an unequal
relationship with the professionals holding most of the power. Traditionally
professional workers have defined, planned and delivered the services, while
disabled people have been passive recipients with little if any opportunity to
exercise control."'
15
Attitudes of medical students toward disabled people become more negative
as their training proceeds. 16 Many providers are inadequately informed and ill-
equipped to understand the "particular constellation of health care needs" of their
disabled patients,' 7 particularly those who are Deaf or hard-of-hearing.' 8 Medical
schools offer little or no training in working with Deaf patients. 19
11. See Harmer, supra note 9, at 85.
12. Barnett, supra note 8, at 694.
13. See Harmer, supra note 9, at 90, 93 (explaining that barriers to heath care for Deaf patients
include: (1) doctors' attitudes that disabilities are deviations from mainstream that should be corrected if
possible; (2) doctors' and Deaf patients' differing frames of reference for situations including health care
delivery; (3) that Deaf patients may have different goals and priorities in their health care treatment than
the doctor; and (4) that doctors may not understand the communication needs and preferences of Deaf
patients).
14. Sally French & John Swain, The Relationship Between Disabled People and Health and
Welfare Professionals, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 734, 735-37 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds.,
2001). Since antiquity, doctors have held themselves out to be healers of humankind, and this has led to
an authoritarianism that is deeply embedded in the practice of medicine. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD
OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT, at xl-xlviii, 28 (1984). Pathologizing difference as illness and asserting
control over treatment of people with illnesses fueled medicine's rise to power and dominance. Irving
Kenneth Zola, Healthisn and Disabling Medicalization, in DISABLING PROFESSIONS 41, 41-42, 51-52
(Ivan Illich et al. eds., 1992).
15. Sally French, Disabled People and Professional Practice, in ON EQUAL TERMS: WORKING
WITH DISABLED PEOPLE 103, 103 (Sally French ed., 1994).
16. lan Basnett, Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Toward Decisions Affecting
Disabled People, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES, supra note 14, at 450, 451-52.
17. Gerben DeJong & Ian Basnett, Disability and Health Policy: The Role of Markets in the
Delivery of Health Services, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES, supra note 14, at 610, 625.
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Many physicians are insufficiently prepared to work with Deaf patients whose
primary mode of communication is sign language.2 ' They often lack the awareness
and knowledge to provide effective communication access in their offices, which in
turn would enhance their treatment of the Deaf patient. 21 Many physicians hold
assumptions, misconceptions, and faulty information about Deaf people and
Deafness that impact their delivery of health care to Deaf patients.22 The problem
of attitudinal barriers is of acute concern to Deaf patients and medical personnel,
from both a human standpoint and a legal standpoint: health care delivery is
compromised if the two parties cannot communicate adequately and effectively.
2 3
Moreover, a doctor's failure to communicate effectively with a Deaf patient
violates federal law.
2 4
18. Harmer, supra note 9, at 73.
19. Barnett, supra note 8, at 694. Very few medical schools train their students in working with
Deaf patients; a bright spot is the University of Rochester School of Medicine where the Deaf Wellness
Center offers training on how to work with Deaf patients. See University of Rochester Medical Center,
Deaf Wellness Center, http://www.urmc.rochester.edu/dwc/index.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2008). Dr.
Robert Q. Pollard of the Deaf Wellness Center has initiated at the University of Rochester School of
Medicine "a first-year medical student seminar organized around direct, non-clinical conversation with
persons who have disabilities, following the exposure method thought to be most effective in improving
beliefs and attitudes about disability." Robert Q. Pollard, Jr., A Consumer Interview Seminar that
Enhances Medical Student Attitudes Toward Persons with Disabilities, 5 ANNALS BEHAV. SCi. & MED.
EDC. 27, 28 (1998). In addition, the University of Rochester School of Medicine adopted a unique role-
reversal exercise called "Deaf Strong Hospital" for first-year medical students where the students were
"patients" in a simulated health-care setting and the "health-care professionals" were volunteers from
the local Deaf community in Rochester. Julie Richards et al., Deaf Strong Hospital: An Exercise in
Cross-Cultural Communication for First Year Medical Students, 10 J. U. ROCHESTER MED. CTR. 5, 5
(1999). This exercise "was designed to teach the first-year students about techniques for overcoming
communication barriers as well as some of the specific challenges in communicating with Deaf or hard-
of-hearing patients." Id. Junior doctors in Northern Ireland are now undergoing sign language and
cultural awareness training in order to improve their delivery of services to Deaf patients. BBC News,
Doctors Training in Sign Language (Apr. 3, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/northem ireland/4799464.stm.
20. Nemon, supra note 8, at 19.
21. See Harmer, supra note 9, at 93-98; Steinberg et al., supra note 8, at 738-40 (explaining how
Deaf women's access to healthcare could be improved by educating providers on how to be more
effective communicators).
22. Golden & Ulrich, supra note 9, at 86; Harmer, supra note 9, at 93; see also Glenn B. Anderson
& Melanie Thorton, Unresolved Issues in the Provision of Mental Health Services to People Who Are
Deaf in RESEARCH AND PRACTICE tN DEAFNESS 211, 211-12, 214-16 (Olga M. Welch ed., 1993)
(explaining how Deaf individuals may have trouble receiving adequate mental health services because
of some mental health professionals' lack of cultural sensitivity).
23. Harmer, supra note 9, at 90, 98-101,
24. Barnett, supra note 8, at 694; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000) (prohibiting owners and
operators of places of public accommodation from discriminating on the basis of disability); 28 C.F.R. §
36.303 (describing the circumstances under which places of public accommodation must provide
"auxiliary aids and services," including qualified interpreters).
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B. Communication Barriers
As noted, many health care professionals labor under several misconceptions.
Many providers think that lip reading is an effective means of communication for
every Deaf person; that all Deaf people can read and write English fluently; and
25that ASL is a manual form of the English language. For many Deaf people, their
inability to read and write English fluently impacts their ability to read lips. 26 Deaf
patients often confront medical personnel who do not understand their struggle with
communication difficulties. 27 When the doctor provides an interpreter, there is a
pervasive belief that the interpreter will instantly and perfectly translate the spoken
language to ASL or whatever variant of sign language the Deaf person
understands. 28 That is often not the case. Interpreters have varying skill, and not
29
every interpreter is the right match for a particular patient in a particular setting.
"Even those [Deaf patients] who are highly literate or well-educated have to
struggle in intense, stressful environments like emergency rooms and hospitals to
make sense of the information flow; the struggle is much more pronounced for
those whose first language is ASL.' '30 Even when a doctor realizes there is a
communication problem, federal case law is replete with examples of physician
resistance to providing an interpreter.31
C. Research Data
Fifteen Deaf people spoke about their experiences with medical doctors as
part of a qualitative research project exploring the subjective experiences of Deaf
25. See Golden & Ulrich, supra note 9, at 86-87; Harmer, supra note 9, at 93-96.
26. See Harmer, supra note 9, at 94.
27. Id. at 73, 98.
28. See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 9, at 869-70; Annie G. Steinberg et al., Cultural and
Linguistic Barriers to Mental Health Service Access: The Deaf Consumer's Perspective 155 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 982, 984 (1998) (explaining that clinicians in the mental health field should not assume
that the presence of an interpreter ensures adequate communication).
29. Harmer, supra note 9, at 96-98.
30. Michael A. Schwartz, Communication in the Doctor's Office: Deaf Patients Talk About Their
Physicians 4-5 (Apr. 10, 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University) (on file with
author).
31. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Dimensions Health Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 636, 637-38 (D. Md. 2005)
Majocha v. Turner, 166 F. Supp. 2d 316, 318 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Falls v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., No.
Civ.A. 97-1545, 1999 WL 33485550, at *3-4 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 1999); People ex rel. Vacco v. Mid
Hudson Med. Group, 877 F. Supp. 143, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The ADA bars a place of public
accommodation, such as a doctor's office, from imposing a surcharge on the person with a disability for
auxiliary aids, 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(c) (2006), and that means the doctor has to absorb the cost of the
interpreter, which can run to $80 per visit. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 273. Presumably doctors do not
like to spend money on something they do not understand or know about, or they do not like to be told
what to do within the parameters of their practice.
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patients in the medical setting.32 These fifteen patients were fluent ASL signers
with ASL as their primary language, and English as a secondary language. 33 The
highest educational achievement for the majority of these patients was high school,
and most held working-class jobs.34 Because Deaf patients communicate
differently, that is, they use sign language rather than speech to express themselves
and to receive information, the patients reported perceiving a degree of discomfort
on the part of their medical providers because of the language difference.35 The
danger is that if there is a communication failure or dysfunction, a doctor may not
observe or verify a Deaf patient's symptoms, that doctor may invalidate or ignore
the patient's narrative, or, in a worst case scenario, make a life-threatening
36
mistake. Because of the language difference, many Deaf patients reported feelings
of frustration, mistrust, and avoidance of health care providers. 37 This led to poor
health outcomes.
38
32. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 1, 56. The research data was developed as part of the author's
dissertation study for which he received a Ph.D. in Education at the Cultural Foundations of Education,
which is part of the School of Education at Syracuse University. See The Center on Human Policy, Law,
and Disability Studies, Syracuse University, Michael Schwartz,
http://disabilitystudies.syr.edu/who/maschwartz.aspx (last visited on March 18, 2008). Rooted in a social
constructivist tradition, see generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 15, 18 (Anchor Books
1967) (1966), and adopting a grounded theory approach, Kathy Charmaz, Grounded Theory, in
CONTEMPORARY FIELD RESEARCH: PERSPECTIVES AND FORMULATIONS 335, 335 (Robert M. Emerson,
ed., 2d ed., 2001), qualitative research aims for research that "collect[s] descriptive data, people's own
words, and people's behavior." STEVEN J. TAYLOR & ROBERT BOGDAN, INTRODUCTION TO
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS: A GUIDEBOOK AND RESOURCE 4 (3d ed. 1998). Qualitative
research is fast emerging as a critical tool in shedding light on the lives of people with disabilities,
showing the complex interrelationship among physical impairment and societal barriers. Bonnie O'Day
& Mary Killeen, Research on the Lives of Persons with Disabilities: The Emerging Importance of
Qualitative Research Methodologies, 13 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 9, 11-12 (2002).
33. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 56-57, 72.
34. Id. at 57-60.
35. See id. at 3-4. Sign language is a very visual and kinesthetic language, involving the use of the
hands, arms, body, and facial movements, a phenomenon that many non-signing hearing people initially
find discomforting because they have never experienced communicating with a signer before. See
Harmer, supra note 9, at 86. It takes a while to get used to it. An apt analogy would be communicating
with a person with Tourette's syndrome, characterized by facial and body tics, and in extreme cases,
coprolalia-uncontrolled profanity. People without Tourette's syndrome and who have never
communicated with a Touretter may feel discomfort in witnessing the behavior, and it takes time to
adjust. See LOWELL HANDLER, A TOURETTER'S TALE: TWITCH AND SHOUT 2, 221-23 (1998).
36. See Nemon, supra note 8, at 19-20. In a study exploring the relationship between Deaf patients
and their doctors, the patients felt that their doctors failed to make a sincere effort to understand them
when the patients described their symptoms. Id. Many patients felt they were treated like children and
frequently given medication without sufficient information and explanation. Id.
37. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 292; see also Elizabeth Ellen Chilton, Ensuring Effective
Communication: The Duty of Health Care Providers to Supply Sign Language Interpreters for Deaf
Patients, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 873-75 (1996); Steinberg et al., supra note 8, at 731. Some doctors and
other health care professionals are becoming increasingly concerned with their cultural competence-
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Because the vast majority of doctors do not sign, Deaf patients are forced to
read and write notes in English. For many of these patients ASL, not English, is
their native language, which places them at a disadvantage when communicating
with their physician.39 Patients who do not have a mastery of written English
expressed discomfort with expressing themselves in a language in which they were
not fluent or literate.4a
Deaf patients reported that the process of writing notes with the doctor was
"time-consuming, incomplete and cursory."' The laboriousness involved in writing
under time constraints reduced both parties to brief questions and answers, and
"question and answer is the customary form of communicative exchange between
powerful and powerless, between adult and child. 4 2 The patients described doctors
as hurrying them through the appointment, impatient with the process of paper-and-
43pen communication . The patients felt disrespected and infantilized, but were
worried about annoying or angering the doctor further if they insisted on fuller
details.44 The doctor's reported unwillingness to take the time to write complex
ideas and wait for the response echoes Foster's finding that "the overall impression
of many [Deaf people] was that hearing people simply didn't have the patience or
motivation to work through difficult communication situations. 4a Consequently,
Deaf patients often miss important information about their health.46 Dominant
communication practices in the medical setting not only reify and reinforce the
power imbalance between patient and doctor; these practices also highlight the
importance of providing appropriate auxiliary aids, including sign language
the ability to empathize with people not like the doctor. Liability is not the sole force driving this
concern; the realization that an awareness of another people's culture and beliefs actually assists the
doctor in delivery of medical services. This realization is beautifully illustrated in a book about the
collision of Hmong culture and American medicine-the doctors see epilepsy in a little girl, while her
family regards her as giving expression to a higher spirituality, a spirituality not to be tampered by
drugs. See generally ANNE FADIMAN, THE SPIRIT CATCHES YOU AND You FALL DOWN: A HMONG
CHILD, HER AMERICAN DOCTORS, AND THE COLLISION OF Two CULTURES (1997).
38. See Chilton, supra note 37, at 873-74; Steinberg et al., supra note 8, at 730-31, 738.
39. Golden & Ulrich, supra note 9, at 86-88; see also Steinberg et al., supra note 8, at 730; Cf
Harmer, supra note 9, at 95-96.
40. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 296-97.
41. Id. at 296.
42. ANN ARNETT FERGUSON, BAD Boys: PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE MAKING OF BLACK
MASCULINITY 13 (4th ed. 2004). In addition, doctors are famous for their unintelligible written scrawls.
Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor's World: Is Physicians' Penmanship More Hazard Than Joke?, N.Y.
TIMES, March II, 1986, at Cl. To expect some Deaf patients to be able to decipher the scribbling of
their physicians is unfair, particularly when it comes to communicating effectively about their health.
43. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 297.
44. Id.
45. Susan B. Foster, Communicating Experiences of Death People: An Ethnographic Account, in
CULTURAL AND LANGUAGE DIVERSITY AND THE DEAF EXPERIENCE 117, 124 (lla Parasnis ed., 1996).
46. Id. at 129.
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interpreters, so that the Deaf patient can enjoy effective communication access,
which hopefully will lead to adequate health care.47
As an adaptation to the aurally inaccessible environment of the medical
setting, many Deaf patients report they are adept at "letting go."'48 If a Deaf patient
is feeling healthy or asymptomatic, she is more likely to "let go," or disregard or
ignore, an instance of communication difficulty with the doctor or nurse.49 If a
patient misses a word, phrase or sentence on the doctor's lips, or if she does not
understand a written word or phrase, she will simply nod as if she understands and
agrees.50 As one patient put it" "If I'm feeling OK, I don't bother to ask for
clarification."
51
47. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 296-97. An argument can be made that this constitutes unjustified
disparate treatment based on disability, which violates the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii)
(2000) ("It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a
disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other
arrangements with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege,
advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals."); 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2000) (noting it is illegal to fail "to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure
that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated
differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services"); 28 C.F.R. §
36.202(a) (2007) ("A public accommodation shall not subject an individual or class of individuals on the
basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or
other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit
from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public
accommodation."). According to the Justice Department, "[t]he ADA mandates an equal opportunity to
participate in or benefit from the goods and services offered by a place of public accommodation." U.S.
Dep't of Justice, ADA Title Ill Technical Assistance Manual, at 111-3.3000,
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3.html#lll-3.3000 (last visited Apr. 3, 2008). Of course, not all
differential treatment based on disability violates the ADA-the whole point behind the ADA is that
there are circumstances where it is permissible, even required, to take disability into consideration when
fashioning either reasonable or appropriate accommodations for people with disabilities. See 28 C.F.R. §
36.202(c) ("A public accommodation shall not provide ... on the basis of disability... accommodation
that is different or separate from that provided to other individuals, unless such action is necessary to
provide the individual or class of individuals with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or
accommodation, or other opportunity that is as effective as that provided to others.") (emphasis added));
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 377-
78(1990).
48. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 298.
49. Id.
50. Id. In its guide for law enforcement officers, the Department of Justice states that when an
officer comes into contact with people who are Deaf or hard of hearing, the officer "should be careful
about misunderstandings in the absence of a qualified interpreter. A nod of the head may be an attempt
to appear cooperative in the midst of misunderstanding, rather than consent or a confession of
wrongdoing." See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guide for Law Enforcement Officers: When in Contact with
People Who Are Deaf or Hard of Hearing, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/hemandoattd.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2008).
51. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 298-99. '"Letting go,' however, carries within it a kernel of
anxiety. The Deaf patient wonders: 'Am I missing something that might come around to bite me in the
rear?' There is always that fear that what information the patient is not obtaining by 'letting go' is
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But medicine is error-ridden-the process of diagnosing and treating illness is
filled with mistakes. 5 2 Because errors unfold as a series of approximations, doctors
must pay continuous attention to the patient's condition. 53 Dialogue permits the
doctor to tailor the delivery and content of care to the needs of the individual
patient, and this requires vigilance on the part of the doctor.54 In a setting that is
wholly aural and communication-inaccessible for many Deaf patients, forcing Deaf
patients to interact with the medical provider without appropriate auxiliary aids-
often a sign language interpreter-holds the potential for tragic error.
55
/. The Experiences of the Fifteen Deaf Patients
This section explores the narratives of the fifteen Deaf patients in this
author's study.56 These stories demonstrate the extent to which communication
access for Deaf patients in the medical setting is problematic. For example, when a
Deaf patient requests an interpreter, many doctors respond: "No. We will not do it."
A classic excuse is, "We can't afford it." Jeff Blye's daughter, Jenny, had serious
cavities, and her regular dentist recommended that she see a pediatric specialist.
The dentist called the specialist and "gave them all the information about the
interpreters, insurance and everything." However, the specialist said he would not
provide an interpreter, and despite the entreaties of the Blye's dentist, the specialist
stood fast in his refusal.
Calvin Pabst's doctor told him he had no choice but to undergo surgery. As
Pabst remembered this visit, "The examining room was a tiny closet-like room with
no windows and a sliding door." The doctor led him to believe her word was final,
exactly the information that is crucial to maintaining one's health." Id. at 299. Whenever the patient
foregoes following up something he or she does not understand, the fear that something will happen
down the road because the patient missed the warning signal is very real. The patient may rationalize
what he is doing by saying the odds of that happening are so slight. Id. However, this process is
unacceptable, particulary given that mistakes made during medical work are commonplace. MARIANNE
A. PAGET, THE UNITY OF MISTAKES: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF MEDICAL WORK 97-
98(1988).
52. PAGET, supra note 51, at 97, 100.
53. Id. at 124-27.
54. Id. at 99-100.
55. The Justice Department acknowledges this much when it says: "It is not difficult to imagine a
wide range of communications involving areas such as health, legal matters, and finances that would be
sufficiently lengthy or complex to require an interpreter for effective communication." 28 C.F.R. §
36.303 app. B at 715 (2007) (quoting Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,567 (July 26,
1991)).
56. This section is drawn from the author's dissertation study. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 141.
Until the end of this section, footnotes will identify when a new page of the dissertation begins.
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and Pabst felt he was not being given a chance to consider other options or to
consult with another doctor. 57 He "wasn't comfortable with her."
a. Abusive Doctor
An interpreter told me that a few years ago he had an opportunity to work
with a doctor who was treating a Deaf indigent African-American patient who was
on Medicaid. For the entire examination, the doctor complained in front of his
patient that he was not making enough money from a Medicaid patient who
required the doctor to provide her with an interpreter. The doctor was visibly angry,
and the interpreter signed everything he was saying. The patient was extremely
distressed.
Emily Lourdes recalled a horrible experience with an elementary school
psychologist that colored her feelings about doctors. The psychologist was giving
Lourdes a test when Lourdes' hearing aid battery expired:
It left me floundering. And, you know, you weren't allowed to keep
batteries in your pocket. Even today, like you know, they didn't want
you to have any aspirin or Tylenol or anything in your pockets. So, you
couldn't keep the hearing aid battery in your pocket, so I would have to
run to the nurse to get it and I didn't have time, so I was, like, "Ooops,
I'm going to have to depend on lip reading." And I thought he asked me,
"What kind of ... what's your favorite animal?," and I answered,
"Horses," and all of a sudden he hauled off and smacked me across the
face. So hard that my hearing aid flew off my ear and I just took off and
I ran to my grandmother's house and hid under a barn. She lived near
the school. I was floored and my face blew up and was red. And after
that I was afraid of doctors because of that experience.f
It turns out that the psychologist had asked Lourdes where milk comes from
and hit her because he thought she was being "smart." Lourdes told her father she
thought he asked what her favorite animal was. Lourdes was eleven years old, and
she thought all doctors were like that school psychologist. Even to this day, she
fears that a doctor will get angry, "and it really makes me feel kind of closed in."
b. Careless Doctor
Richard Franklin recalled a communication breakdown with his cardiologist
who mistakenly put him down as a carpenter and did not bother to follow up with
him.59 Franklin had been a carpenter in a different state, and when he moved to
New York, he became a civil engineer with a state agency; however, his
57. Id. at 141-42.
58. Id. at 142 (quoting patient Emily Lourdes during an interview with the author where Lourdes
described an experience that she had with a school psychologist).
59. Id. at 143.
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cardiologist assumed he was still a carpenter and wrote that in Franklin's file. This
had serious repercussions for Franklin's open heart surgery because the kind of job
a patient has plays a determining role in the kind of valve a heart surgeon inserts in
a diseased heart. The surgeon had read in Franklin's file that he was a carpenter and
based on that, recommended a pig valve, which has a life span of only 20 years as
opposed to a lifetime warranty for a mechanical valve.
What was interesting about this incident was the fact that the surgeon gave
Franklin his e-mail address and encouraged Franklin to communicate with him in
that way. Franklin thought that was "very cool," and when the surgeon
recommended the pig valve, Franklin went online to research the difference
between the pig and mechanical valves. By prodding the surgeon on why he
preferred one valve to the other, Franklin was able to uncover the cardiologist's
erroneous information.
Hetty Smith offered another example of a doctor who could have used more
care. If Smith's daughter was unavailable, Smith went in anyway:
One time, it happened that I hurt my shoulder and relied on my
daughter-and I wasn't happy about that. So I called my doctor and told
him my shoulder hurts, it is important. The doctor said to come in. So I
went in at 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon. I told him my shoulder hurt, and
the doctor and I wrote notes back and forth. I told him about my
problem, and the doctor examined me and took an X-ray. Everything
looked normal. I told him I was in pain. So he gave me a pain-killing
medicine. The doctor gave me medicine.
60
However, the medicine, according to Smith, was an antibiotic. 6 The doctor
gave her medicine without explaining its purpose. Asked if the doctor explained
what the medicine was for, Smith replied: "He told me to take it everyday, every
four hours." He did not explain in more detail; he did not tell her the name of the
drug or what it was for. Smith recalled that "he just gave it to me and told me how
many times a day to take it. He gave it to me for pain, that was it." An antibiotic for
pain? One wonders what was in the written communication that would lead a
doctor to prescribe an antibiotic for pain.
c. Unresponsive Doctor
Penelope Durst once wrote a letter in advance in which she outlined her
expectations and goals for the visit. It was her "attempt to improve communication"
with her doctor. The letter expressed Durst's desire "to know what is going on. I
would like to know what the test results are .... I say [sic] in the letter what I'm
60. Id. at 143 (quoting patient Hetty Smith during an interview with the author where Smith
described an experience that she had with her doctor).
61. Id. at 144.
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concerned about and I hope to know about what's going on." However, the doctor
did not respond, and Durst felt like she did not have a rapport with her doctor.
Durst felt the doctor did not understand why she felt the need to write the letter. So
she tried again, telling the doctor:
You know, this is my personality. I'd really like to know what's going
on. I want to have all the information and sometimes it's busy in the
office and I thought that maybe this would be a way to improve our
communication. You know, I want to know what would be involved.
[The letter] was really an attempt at building a relationship.
62
The doctor responded, "Well, let me know if there is anything else that you
want to know." Durst was dissatisfied with that answer.
Durst felt the doctor was infantilizing her because "she didn't really share
with me what was going on. She didn't really share with me things that she had
discovered and I felt that was important information for me to know. Very
specifically what was going on and I felt awkward with her." 63 When Durst asked
to see her medical records, the doctor gave her a hard time:
Oh, well, there's a procedure you have to follow. I said, "Well, okay,
there's a procedure, I'm just asking for a copy. I was wondering if I
could read [my file]. And the doctor said, "Well, what are you worried
about?" And I was, like, "No, I just want to know what my record says,
you know.
64
Durst insisted on being allowed to read her medical file, and the doctor said,
"You look like you're worried," and Durst said, "I'm not worried, I just want to
read my medical record." Finally the doctor said, "Well, I'll find out who you'll
have to talk to so you can have access to your medical records." Durst and her
doctor did not have an interpreter. In fact, the hassle over Durst's medical records
made her leery about requesting an interpreter: "I'm afraid if I ask for an
interpreter, they'll say no. They'll give me a reason like there's no money, or
whatever. That I may not be able to fight against [sic]. And they'll say, well you
know you can bring an interpreter yourself or you're responsible to pay for it ... I
didn't really want to ask."
Even though Penelope Durst understands that the law requires the doctor to
provide an interpreter, she does not want to deal with "the frustration and the hassle
of setting the stage for that .... it's really difficult to prove discrimination. And
you know, I find that they resist as a matter of course. I don't feel like they take
responsibility and a lot of them aren't aware of the ADA. It's a little overwhelming
62. Id. (quoting patient Penelope Durst during an interview with the author where Durst described
her attempts to improve communications with her doctor).
63. Id. at 144-45.
64. Id. at 145 (quoting patient Penelope Durst during an interview with the author where Durst
described her attempts to review her medical records).
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for me. It's a little too much and frustrating for me and they don't get it. So
sometimes it's just easier to just go to the doctor, without [the interpreter]."
Penelope Durst's worst experience with a doctor involved one who would not
look at her, instead looking to other people for answers. The key to effective
communication for Deaf people is eye contact.65 Often, when a Deaf person speaks
with a hearing person and he or she looks down or away, the Deaf person stops
talking because without that eye contact, the Deaf person feels he cannot go on
talking. Not surprisingly, Durst felt her doctor was not listening to her. Without that
eye contact, communication falls apart.
d. Resistant Doctor
When I asked Richard Franklin to contrast his work with private doctors with
his experiences in the Monroe infirmary, Franklin grimaced:
It's interesting. In New Jersey, where I worked, I had hassles with the
doctors. Their attitude was [sic] different than the attitudes of doctors
here in New York, which has a more diverse population, it's more open,
more interaction with different people. In New Jersey, it's different. I
had more hassles down there.66
Asked to clarify what he meant by "different," Franklin complained that New
Jersey doctors almost never provided interpreters. Franklin always "had to struggle
with them." The doctors would say they would provide an interpreter, but when
Franklin showed up, an interpreter was not there.
Richard Franklin: "An interpreter? I called for an interpreter." I [would]
look at them skeptically, and when I check[ed] with the agency, I find
out the agency never got the call. So that way the doctor is playing
around.
Michael A. Schwartz: Does that happen often?
Richard Franklin: Once in a while. But once a doctor gets to know me,
when I go in regularly, they don't do that.
Franklin would go ahead with the visit "many times, many times." Asked
how he communicated in these situations, Franklin recalled that it was "tough."
However, he has good lip reading, English speaking, and writing skills. Writing
notes was always a fall back position for both Franklin and his doctor.
Richard Franklin never had an interpreter with his family doctor until after
my interview with him when he decided to ask for one and ran into difficulty. 67 As
Franklin recalled:
65. Id. at 145-46.
66. Id. at 146 (quoting patient Richard Franklin during an interview with the author where Franklin
described the attitudinal differences between doctors in New York and New Jersey).
67. Id. at 147.
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"It was a big shock to me. I was floored. Here, all this time I hadn't been
using an interpreter and when I make the decision to call one in because
of the nature of my problem, I didn't abuse the whole idea of having an
interpreter. I never used one. And so here now when I need one, I ask
for one, he tells me no. I was shocked. Really!"
Emily Lourdes does not use an interpreter during dental visits. She has been
going to the same dentist for many years, "and we write back and forth." She has
no problems with her teeth and feels comfortable without an interpreter in the
dental office. Asked why she wanted an interpreter with a doctor but not the
dentist, Lourdes said: "Well, I haven't used one because the communication is fine.
I communicate well with the nurse, the dentists, the dental assistant, the hygienist.
If there's anything serious, we write back and forth."
Lourdes is satisfied with that process, but medical doctors are a problem:
Because they are resistant [sic]. The communication with the doctor is
limited because it's a last minute appointment, we don't have much
time. Now a medical doctor books many people at once. They book
them every five or ten minutes, so there's really a limited time in
between patients. They don't have a lot of time to go into any in-depth
68
explanations.
e. Billed for Communication Time
Lourdes raised an interesting issue, one that had not come up with the other
respondents-she suspects she is being charged for the extra time it takes the
doctor to communicate with her. She noticed several bills reflected a charge for the
additional ten minutes; "for example, [in] a regular visit, if you ask a lot of
questions and I have to write things down, I'm stealing time from another patient.69
And they count it as an extended visit." Lourdes objects:
Extended visit? Instead of a regular visit, hey, if I get the time and
there's more time to talk and communicate because they're writing, you
know I need to do that and here I am being charged for an extended visit
because of the communication. What do you think of that? If I have to
talk to the doctor, I feel that's discrimination.7 °
Lourdes's insurance covers the extra time, so she does not say anything to her
doctor:
But they shouldn't do that because a Deaf person needs, or a blind
person or a person with handicapped [sic], a mentally retarded person..
68. Id. (quoting patient Emily Lourdes during an interview with the author where Lourdes
described communication problems with her doctor).
69. Id. at 147-48.
70. Id. at 148 (quoting patient Emily Lourdes during an interview with the author where Lourdes
discussed an extended visit charge she received from her doctor).
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• how [do] they communicate with them? If they don't feel comfortable,
so what happens if it's a minute too long or [ten] minutes more and
they're charging the extra for an extended visit because it's gone over?
Lourdes calls doctors "greedy."
f Doctor Refused to Allow Substitute to Replace ZIG Interpreter
Emily Lourdes had a bad experience with one doctor. She made arrangements
for medical tests. It involved a serious health problem, and Lourdes needed to
communicate with him during the test. She thus arranged to have an interpreter
present for the exam, and Zamboni Interpreter Gigs called to confirm the
assignment of an interpreter. However, the day before that medical exam, Zamboni
informed Lourdes that the interpreter was unavailable. Lourdes, already in pain and
dealing with anxiety over the test, became very upset. She was fearful she would
have to put off the test and did not want to "because it would be another six months
before I could get an appointment." Lourdes pressed the agency and learned that
the interpreter discovered the assignment involved medical interpreting and
declined to accept the assignment due to lack of experience in this area of
interpreting. Agitated and angry, Lourdes called her contacts in the Deaf
community and found someone who would be willing to interpret at the
examination. 71 Lourdes then called the doctor, and the doctor said, "No, we only
accept interpreters from Zamboni Interpreter Gigs." Incredulous and angry,
Lourdes replied, "What!? What do you mean?" The doctor said, "No, we have to
work with Zamboni Interpreter Gigs interpreters because we have a contract with
Zamboni."
Emily Lourdes asked me for my advice on this problem. After I explained my
view, Lourdes recounted how the situation ended:
Zamboni Interpreter Gigs failed to provide the interpreter, I have
someone who is willing, you know, who can sign to me. She's not
connected with Zamboni, and she's not under their auspices. So, they
said, "Sorry, we have a contract with Zamboni." So I asked this person
if she would interpret for me anyway, and then I paid for her. If I go to
court and I actually sue these people and get some money, then the
interpreter can pay me back. So anyway . . . charging for gas and
mileage, she said she would work it out, and I said if there was a court
deal, we'll try to work the whole thing out. And I tried ... I did try one
lawyer, but it wasn't successful. I didn't want to get into suing Zamboni
Interpreter Gigs.
72
71. Id. at 148-49.
72. Id. at 149 (quoting patient Emily Lourdes during an interview with the author where Lourdes
discussed the problems that she faced when trying to bring her interpreter to her doctor's office).
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g. Problems with Communication Access
Amanda Blye had a communication breakdown with the doctor because the
interpreter was not clear. She was experiencing a high-risk pregnancy, and she
wanted to communicate her fears and anxieties about her pregnancy to the doctor.
However, Amanda has a tendency to sign very fast, and she fingerspells in a blur. It
is not easy to voice for her, and not surprisingly the interpreter had a lot of
difficulty in understanding Amanda and voicing properly for her. Luckily for
Amanda, she has enough "gumption" to say something, and she informed the
doctor she wanted a replacement. The doctor readily agreed, and another interpreter
from Zamboni Interpreter Gigs was called in to replace the first interpreter.
As if comprehending written English was not enough of a problem, Deaf
patients have to deal with deciphering the doctor's handwriting and understanding
its meaning.73 Having to write notes back and forth with her doctor, Amanda stated,
"sometimes I don't understand what [the doctor has] written ... the doctor notices
that, too.. . sometimes I don't understand the way she writes, the handwriting."
A fear of angering the doctor or feeling intrusive into the doctor's time leads
to the phenomenon of "letting it go." I had asked Vinnie Brasco if he followed up a
word or phrase he did not understand in a written communication from his doctor,
and he said, "No. I let it go." I asked him, "Why did you let it go?" He said, "I
could sense [the doctor] was in a hurry and I didn't want him to be impatient with
me. I didn't want to intrude on his time."
Like many Deaf people, Brasco is keenly tuned into the visual: he could sense
from the doctor's body language and facial expression how he was dealing with the
writing process. When I asked Brasco what he remembered of the doctor's facial
expression while writing notes, Brasco replied, "to me, it looked like he was
'tolerating' me... being patient ... when he would start to show a difference in his
body language, like he was getting impatient and wanted to hurry up, then I would
feel uncomfortable."
Some of the subjects confessed to a lack of confidence in their ability to
express themselves in writing with the doctor. Richard Franklin recalled:
Well urn, okay, if I write a question down and they can't answer it, I
assume that they don't understand my question. Not that they don't
know the answer. I wonder if they think [sic]. I mean the question is
phrased wrong and I think that's interesting, so I tend to drop it. That's
why an interpreter is good because the issue of how I'm phrasing the
question, how I'm asking it doesn't come in.74
73. Id. at 150.
74. Id. (quoting patient Richard Franklin during an interview with the author where Franklin
described difficulties that he faced when attempting to communicate with his doctor through hand-
written notes).
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Bea Romanoff pointed out the difficulty she had in pressing her claim against
a doctor who would not provide access:
Sometimes I don't follow up because I get so caught up in the things
that I'm doing, and then time passes. I really should, but I didn't follow
up in that case. I was intimidated too, I think. And when you do file a
complaint, the paperwork for that has so much detail.7 5
Romanoff's English skills were good, so she was able to process and file a
complaint against a particular doctor. However, as she realized, writing out a
complaint is very difficult for an average Deaf person. Many of Romanoff's clients
use ASL as their primary mode of communication, not English, much less spoken
English. Romanoff finds she had to assist them with their correspondence:
Many times I have to help my clients understand what's written in
letters to them. That's part of my job, so I'm very familiar with the gaps
in their English language usage. They would tell me what they want to
say in ASL, and then I have to translate it into English and type it out on
forms and things like that. Sometimes things happen, and I don't follow-
up with my own life, but I've done that kind of advocating for others.
76
In addition, a Deaf person may be afraid to ask for an interpreter because he
or she does not have good communication skills or is less well-educated. According
to Romanoff, "They may not know their rights, the doctor won't see them, or they
are sick and they want to get on with being treated."
Hetty Smith's experience with her daughter as an interpreter is an illustration
of the danger in using a family member to interpret: lack of clarity, failure to
communicate the details of the conversation, leaving the Deaf person out, and
simplifying the information ("dumbing down"):
So I asked my doctor, "Would you mind my daughter interpreting? It
wouldn't be often." He said, no, he wouldn't mind. My daughter came
with me, and we were together in the doctor's office. You know, my
daughter isn't a super interpreter. She's not clear. So she talked with the
doctor, talk, talk, talk, and I kept having to say, "What did you say?
What did he say?" They talked with each other, and I was left out. I kept
asking, "What did you say? What did he say?" She simplified things for
me. I wasn't satisfied.77
It is striking that Smith felt compelled to ask her doctor if it would be okay
for Smith's daughter to mediate as interpreter, and to qualify the request as an
75. Id. at 151 (quoting patient Bea Romanoff during an interview with the author where Romanoff
described her reluctance to file complaints against her doctors).
76. Id. (quoting patient Bea Romanoff during an interview with the author where Romanoff
discusses her attempts to translate correspondence for other Deaf patients).
77. Id. at 151-52 (quoting patient Hetty Smith during an interview with the author where Smith
discussed utilizing her daughter as an interpreter during a visit with her doctor).
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intermittent one. The problem was that the daughter had her own life to live and
was not always available. In that event, Smith wrote notes back and forth, but the
notes were even less satisfactory:
Sometimes I'd go in and write back and forth. My daughter is busy, she
has other responsibilities, so when she didn't come, the doctor and I
would write notes back and forth. The doctor didn't always explain
clearly about my health. It was a mess. I wasn't happy.
Even with her daughter as interpreter, Smith had no privacy in her doctor's
office:
I didn't have any privacy, yes. But anyway we didn't go into any depth
with the doctor. My daughter would tell me the important things. Blood
pressure, that kind of thing. It worked out. The doctor would tell me
about my medicine. He would write it down. Then me and my daughter
would leave.
7 8
II. AN EFFORT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM: REQUIRING APPROPRIATE AUXILIARY
AIDS UNDER THE ADA
In a long overdue effort to address discrimination against people with
disabilities, including those who are Deaf or hard-of-hearing, the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), a pioneering civil rights act for people with
disabilities, requires places of public accommodation such as physicians' offices
and hospitals to provide effective access for people with disabilities. Effective
communication access for Deaf individuals often includes sign language
interpreters.79 According to the ADA, "[n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of
public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation."
80
78. Id. at 152 (quoting patient Hetty Smith during an interview with the author).
79. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (2000)). A doctor's office is included in the twelve
categories of public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2007) ("Place of
public accommodation means a facility, operated by a private entity, whose operations affect commerce
and fall within at least one of the following categories . . . professional office of a health care
provider."). To avoid confusion, the author will use the term, "doctor's office," in lieu of "place of
public accommodation" or "public accommodation" because the terms are interchangeable, and because
the focus of this article is on the doctor's office. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). By the same token, by the
term, "doctor's office," the author means to include hospitals and medical clinics, both of which are
included in the legal definition of a public accommodation. Id.; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
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The general prohibition against discrimination envisions activities of the
following sort: denial of participation, 8' participation in an integrated setting 82 and
an opportunity to participate.83 Two specific prohibitions against discrimination
particularly interest Deaf patients: "a failure to make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices or procedures,"84 and "a failure to [provide] auxiliary aids or
services." 85 These provisions seek to remove communication barriers and to
include and integrate Deaf people into everyday American life.
81. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i) ("It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of
individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to
participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
of an entity."); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.202(a) ("A public accommodation shall not subject an individual
•.. on the basis of disability.., to a denial of opportunity... to participate in or benefit from the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.").
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(B) ("Goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a disability in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of the individual."); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.203(a) ("A public accommodation
shall afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations to an individual with
a disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.").
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(C) ("Notwithstanding the existence of separate or different programs
or activities provided in accordance with this section, an individual with a disability shall not be denied
the opportunity to participate in such programs and activities that are not separate or different."). See
also 28 C.F.R. § 36.203(b) ("Notwithstanding the existence of separate or different programs or
activities provided in accordance with this subpart, a public accommodation shall not deny an individual
with a disability an opportunity to participate in such programs or activities that are not separate or
different.").
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). See also 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) ("A public accommodation shall
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when the modifications are
necessary to afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals
with disabilities, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that making the modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations."). Similarly, a public accommodation must remove structural communication barriers
(permanent signage, alarm systems, sound buffers, walls) if "readily achievable." 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(a). However, this obligation is independent of any obligation to
provide auxiliary aids and services. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 app. B at 709 (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(v).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). The Justice Department regulation echoes the statute:
A public accommodation shall take those steps that may be necessary to ensure that no
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated
differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless
the public accommodation can demonstrate that taking those steps would fundamentally alter
the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being
offered or would result in an undue burden, i.e., significant difficulty or expense.
28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a). The Department's commentary states, "The Department wishes to emphasize that
public accommodations must take steps necessary to ensure that an individual with a disability will not
be excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently from other individuals because
of the use of inappropriate or ineffective auxiliary aids." 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 app. B at 708 (2006). "As
provided in Section 36.303(l), a public accommodation is not required to provide any particular aid or
service that would result either in a fundamental alteration in the nature of the goods, services, facilities,
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The key is effective communication access: "A public accommodation shall
furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective
communication with individuals with disabilities." 86 The auxiliary aid requirement
is flexible: "A public accommodation may choose among various alternatives as
long as the result is effective communication."'87 What constitutes "effective
communication" is a question of fact.88 However, commentary by the Department
of Justice states: "It is not difficult to imagine a wide range of communications
involving areas such as health, legal matters, and finances that would be
privileges, advantages, or accommodations offered or in an undue burden." Id. at 709. In determining
whether an action would impose an undue burden on a public accommodation, the following factors
must be considered:
(1) The nature and cost of the action needed under this part; (2) The overall financial
resources of the site or sites involved in the action; the number of persons employed at the
site; the effect on expenses and resources; legitimate safety requirements that are necessary
for safe operation, including crime prevention measures; or the impact otherwise of the
action upon the operation of the site; (3) The geographic separateness, and the administrative
or fiscal relationship of the site or sites in question to any parent corporation or entity; (4) If
applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent corporation or entity; the overall size
of the parent corporation or entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number,
type, and location of its facilities; and (5) If applicable, the type of operation or operations of
any parent corporation or entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce of the parent corporation or entity.
28 C.F.R. § 36.104. Most courts addressing the issue of cost "have noted that a reasonable
accommodation is both moderate and not unduly burdensome." Bravin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 186
F.R.D. 293, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 1994); Rothschild
v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 1990).
86. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c). As the Department's commentary explains:
Implicit in this duty to provide auxiliary aids and services is the underlying obligation of a
public accommodation to communicate effectively with its customers, clients, patients, or
participants who have disabilities affecting hearing, vision, or speech ... [a]uxiliary aids and
services include a wide range of services and devices for ensuring effective communication.
Use of the most advanced technology is not required so long as effective communication is
ensured.
28 C.F.R. § 36.303 app. B at 706 (2006). Despite the urging of commentators, the Department refused to
enumerate the list of possible appropriate accommodations, saying, "[s]uch an attempt would omit new
devices that will become available with emerging technology." Id.
87. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 app. B at 707 (2007). For example, a bookstore engaged in a sales
transaction would not be required to provide a sign language interpreter because a notepad and pen
would be effective under these circumstances. Id.
88. Bravin, 186 F.R.D. at 302; see also Borkowski v. Valley Central Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 141
(2d Cir. 1995); Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 141, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). For this reason,
the issue is not appropriately disposed of on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint. Bravin, 186
F.R.D. at 302 (noting that plaintiff's pleading states a claim upon which relief could be granted and
concluding that the fact-finder must determine whether Mt. Sinai provided "reasonable and effective"
means of communication); see also Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 827-28
(rejecting defendant's motion for summary judgment because courts generally focus on "specific
instances during the interaction between the disabled individual and the public accommodation .... ).
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sufficiently lengthy or complex to require an interpreter for effective
communication. 89
Auxiliary aids and services include qualified sign language interpreters or
other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials available to
individuals with hearing impairments. 90 A qualified sign language interpreter can
"interpret effectively, accurately and impartially, both receptively and expressively,
using any necessary specialized vocabulary."9 1 Public accommodations may not
charge Deaf or hard-of-hearing people for an auxiliary aid or service, or for the
reasonable modification to a policy, practice or procedure.92
Even if the original auxiliary aid or service is deemed too expensive or
constitutes a fundamental alteration to the program or service of the public
accommodation, the public accommodation is still obligated to provide an
alternative auxiliary aid or service that would ensure, to the maximum extent
possible, access to the place of public accommodation. 93  The public
accommodation does not have to provide the person with a disability with a
personal aid or device like a hearing aid or a cane.9 4 Likewise, nothing in the law or
89. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 app. B at 708 (2006).
90. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b) ("The term 'auxiliary aids and services' includes-() Qualified
interpreters, notetakers, computer-aided transcription services, written materials, telephone handset
amplifiers, assistive listening devices, assistive listening systems, telephones compatible with hearing
aids, closed caption decoders, open and closed captioning, telecommunications devices for Deaf persons
(TDDs), videotext displays, or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials available
to individuals with hearing impairments."). Another example of "auxiliary aids and services" is the
"[a]cquisition or modification of equipment or devices." Id. § 36.303(b)(3).
91. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2007) (defining "qualified interpreter"); see also Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898
F. Supp. 1019, 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
92. 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(c) ("A public accommodation may not impose a surcharge on a particular
individual with a disability or any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of measures,
such as the provision of auxiliary aids, barrier removal, alternatives to barrier removal, and reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, that are required to provide that individual or group
with the nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act or this part."). As the Department's
commentary points out, "[t]he costs of compliance with the requirements of this section may not be
financed by surcharges limited to particular individuals with disabilities or any group of individuals with
disabilities." 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 app. B at 716 (2007).
93. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(f) ("If provision of a particular auxiliary aid or service by a public
accommodation would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered or in an undue burden, i.e., significant
difficulty or expense, the public accommodation shall provide an alternative auxiliary aid or service, if
one exists, that would not result in an alteration or such burden but would nevertheless ensure that, to the
maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations offered by the public accommodation.").
94. 28 C.F.R. § 36.306 ("Personal Devices and Services. This part does not require a public
accommodation to provide its customers, clients, or participants with personal devices, such as
wheelchairs; individually prescribed devices, such as prescription eyeglasses or hearing aids; or services
of a personal nature including assistance in eating, toileting, or dressing.").
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regulations require a person with a disability to accept "an accommodation, aid,
service, opportunity, or benefit available" offered by the public accommodation.,
95
In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination against a
medical provider under Title III of the ADA, the plaintiff must prove three
elements: (1) that she has a disability; (2) that defendant's office is a place of public
accommodation; and (3) that defendant discriminated against her by engaging in a
proscribed activity based on the plaintiffs disability. 96 The plaintiff must show
circumstances giving rise to an inference that the denial of the full and equal
enjoyment of medical treatment is based on the plaintiffs disability. 97
Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to prove that he or she did not discriminate against the plaintiff.98 The
defendant must prove either that the plaintiff was not denied access to the medical
provider's office, or that the denial was not unlawful; the burden then shifts back to
plaintiff to rebut defendant's reasons as pretext for unlawful discrimination.
99
Title III provides two mechanisms for enforcement. The first mechanism
authorizes a private plaintiff to seek an injunction barring ongoing discrimination
95. 28 C.F.R. § 36.203(c). Under the ADA, a public accommodation is "strongly encourage[d]" to
consider a disabled person's choice of an auxiliary aid or service for the purpose of assisting the person
in communicating with the public accommodation, but it is not required to give deference to the disabled
person's preference. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 app. B at 707-08 (2006) ("Based upon a careful review of the
ADA legislative history, the Department believes that Congress did not intend under Title Ill to impose
upon a public accommodation the requirement that it give primary consideration to the request of the
individual with a disability [and] . . . finds that strongly encouraging consultation with persons with
disabilities, in lieu of mandating primary consideration of their expressed choice, is consistent with
congressional intent.").
96. Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (E.D. Mich. 1994). With respect to Deaf
patients complaining about the denial of appropriate auxiliary aids in the medical setting, the third
element, the nexus between the complained-of activity and the plaintiffs disability, is the crux of much
of the litigation under review in this article.
97. Id. at 1166. The plaintiff does not need to prove actual discriminatory intent in order to
establish the prima facie case. Id. (analogizing ADA cases to cases interpreting § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000)).
98. Id.
99. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the allocation of the burden of proof in
a case involving "reasonable modification" to a brewery company's "no animals" policy at its brewery,
which was challenged by a blind tourist who wanted to take the group tour with his guide dog. Johnson
v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 1052, 1056, 1058 (5th Cir. 1997). The brewery offered to provide an
employee in lieu of the guide dog. Id. at 1056. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff had the burden of
coming forward with proof that a modification to defendant's policy was requested, and that the
modification was a reasonable one. Id. at 1059. Then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the
requested modification would fundamentally alter the nature of its business. Id. Defendant's evidence
cannot be of a general nature; it must be specific to the plaintiff's and defendant's circumstances. Id. at
1059-60. If the defendant is successful in doing this, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to
demonstrate pretext. Mayberry, 843 F. Supp. at 1166.
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based on disability. 00 The private plaintiff cannot obtain injunctive relief for a
single past incident of discrimination without a showing that the discrimination is
continuing or ongoing.101 Injunctive relief is the sole remedy for a private plaintiff;
compensatory damages are not recoverable in a private civil suit.10 2
The second mechanism authorizes the Attorney General of the United States
to investigate and prosecute violations of the ADA when the Attorney General has
reasonable cause to believe that a defendant is engaged in a pattern or practice of
discrimination, or that the discrimination raises an issue of public importance. 103
Unlike a private plaintiff, the Attorney General may seek injunctive relief for past
discriminatory conduct, 1°4 monetary damages for aggrieved persons,'0 5 and civil
penalties against the defendant of up to $50,000 for a first violation and up to
$100,000 for a subsequent violation.' 0 6
Title III of the ADA allows a disabled person to sue for injunctive relief
where the person has "actual notice" that a person or organization covered by Title
III does not intend to comply with its provisions: "Nothing in this section shall
require a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has
actual notice that a person or organization covered by this subchapter does not
intend to comply with its provisions."'' l0
The "actual notice" standard obviates the need for the person to seek access to
the place of public accommodation (e.g., the doctor's office or hospital) as a
precursor to filing suit.' 08
100. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 36.501. Injunctive relief is available to compel the
removal of architectural and communication barriers "that are structural in nature," 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), as well as to make new facilities "readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities," id. § 12183(a)(1). Additionally, "[w]here appropriate, injunctive relief shall also
include requiring the provision of an auxiliary aid or service." Id. § 12188(a)(2).
101. DeLil v. El Torito Rests., Inc., No. C 94-3900-CAL, 1997 WL 714866, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June
24, 1997).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) (providing for injunctive relief in private suits by affected parties). The
Attorney General has the authority to bring a civil action and request compensatory damages on behalf
of private parties. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b) (providing for civil penalties ranging from $50,000 to $100,000
per violation); Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280, 1283 (1 lth Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. ACAA, 247 F. Supp.
2d 61, 67 (D.P.R. 2003); Riggs v. Curia Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1215 (D. Kan. 2001);
Atakpa v. Perimeter Ob-Gyn Assocs., 912 F. Supp. 1566, 1573 (N.D. Ga. 1994); see also Ruth Colker,
ADA Title IlI: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 378 (2000).
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12188(b)(l)(A)(i), (b)(l)(B).
104. See id. § 12188(b)(l)(B)(ii) (authorizing enforcement action when discrimination "raises an
issue of general public importance"); DeLil, No. C 94-3900-CAL, 1997 WL 714866, at *5 (noting that
the Attorney General may bring a civil suit for past discrimination under § 12188(b)(l)(B)).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(B).
106. Id. § 12188(b)(2)(C).
107. Id. § 12188(a)(I).
108. ANNE MARIE ESTEVEZ & BETH S. JOSEPH, PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 14:3(2) (2006).
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The ADA's access requirements are backed up by federal regulations issued
by the Justice Department. °9 The law establishes the right of a Deaf patient to
receive an appropriate auxiliary aid to obtain effective communication access in the
medical setting, which often means a sign language interpreter. 0 Furthermore, the
law places the financial responsibility for providing such an aid with the medical
provider."' Yet, when a Deaf patient encounters a recalcitrant provider and seeks a
court-ordered injunction forcing the provider to comply with the law, the patient
who is unwilling to return to the provider's office runs into a major problem of
justiciability: standing.
II. THE LAW OF STANDING
Pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts are
constrained to hear only "cases" or "controversies,"''1 2 and standing to sue (or
defend) is an aspect of the case or controversy requirement." 3 Standing examines
whether "a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to
obtain judicial resolution of that controversy."" 4 Standing is more concerned with
the party seeking relief than with the issues he or she wishes to raise in the suit." 
5
Establishing standing requires a showing of three prongs: injury-in-fact, causation,
and redressability." 6 The Supreme Court breaks injury-in-fact into two categories:
the type of harm and future injury.' The cases involving medical facilities'
provision of appropriate auxiliary aids to Deaf patients are mostly within the latter
109. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.101 (2007).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 (listing the example of auxiliary aids available to
Deaf people); ld. § 36.104 (explaining that pharmacies, professional offices and hospitals are places of
public accommodation).
111. 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(c). Congress stated that the law's purpose was "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities . . . to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities ... and, to invoke the sweep of congressional authority ... in order
to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. §
12101(b)(i)-(2), (4). See also Elizabeth Keadle Markey, The ADA's Last Stand?: Standing and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 185, 190 (2002).
112. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
113. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("One of those landmarks, setting
apart the 'Cases' and 'Controversies' that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article Ill ... is the
doctrine of standing.").
114. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417, 430 (1998) (finding that a party must have a "personal stake," and suffered an actual injury to
have standing).
115. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
116. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
117. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (citations omitted).
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category: whether the plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient imminence of harm in a
future injury to establish standing." 8
Generally, an allegation of future injury confers standing on a plaintiff if the
plaintiff shows "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical"' injury. 119
Proceeding on the theory that a plaintiff does not have to wait to actually suffer the
threatened injury before acquiring standing to sue, the Court granted standing to
nursing home residents who sued to prevent contemplated transfers to other nursing
home facilities; 120 political officeholders who challenged restrictions on candidacy
for other state offices without actually defying those restrictions; 121 and, a union
that, threatened with prosecution if it engaged in certain conduct, disputed
regulations on labor representation elections and consumer publicity. 
22
The Court does not always grant standing to plaintiffs for future injuries. The
Court found speculative, for example, a pediatrician's efforts to defend a state's
restrictions on abortion on the premise that the restrictions would lead to more
paying patients; 123 a group of environmentalists' challenge to the federal
government's foreign practices under the Endangered Species Act; 124 and a death
row prisoner's efforts to stop the execution of another condemned prisoner who
gave up his right to appeal.
125
118. See infra Part III.A.
119. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155. The "threatened injury must be 'certainly impending' to constitute
an injury in fact." Id. at 158 (citations omitted).
120. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 993, 1002 (1982).
121. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 959, 962 (1982).
122. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 293, 298-99 (1979).
123. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 56, 66 (1986).
124. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557-67 (1992). In Lujan, environmental groups
attacked a regulation promulgated under the Endangered Species Act that restricted the law's effect to
the United States or on the high seas. Id. at 557-59. The plaintiffs introduced affidavits in an attempt to
establish an injury-in-fact. Id. at 563. The first affidavit contended that the affiant traveled to Egypt to
study the Nile crocodile and intended to return for further study, and the second affidavit contended that
the affiant traveled to Sri Lanka to study the natural habitat of that country and intended to return to Sri
Lanka, but had no current plans to do so. Id. at 563-64. The Court found that plaintiff's affidavits did
not establish the injury-in-fact element, stating that "[s]uch 'some day' intentions-without any
description of concrete plans, or indeed even any speculation of when the some day will be--do not
support a finding of the 'actual and imminent' injury that our cases require." Id. at 564. What is
significant in Lujan is the fact that the Court held firm to its jurisprudence that recognized Congress'
power to "elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were
previously inadequate in law." Id. at 578. As one commentator points out, "The opinion in Lujan,
therefore, does not foreclose the possibility of standing pursuant to a statutory grant." Markey, supra
note I11, at 195.
125. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 151 (1990). The prisoner argued that if he won habeas
corpus review and a new trial followed by a new death sentence, he wanted to make sure, for purposes
of the state court's comparison of his case to other capital cases, that the database included the details of
the other condemned prisoner's crime. Id. at 156-57.
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In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, Adolph Lyons, an African-American resident
of Los Angeles, 126 alleged that he was subjected to a police chokehold without
provocation or justification during a routine traffic stop, which rendered him
unconscious and damaged his throat. 127 Lyons brought suit against the officers
involved in the stop and the city of Los Angeles, seeking damages and injunctive
relief barring the use of the chokehold except in situations involving the immediate
threat of deadly force. 128 The Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff must allege an
actual case or controversy that meets Article III's threshold requirement:
Plaintiff must demonstrate a 'personal stake in the outcome' in order to
'assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues' necessary for the proper resolution of constitutional questions.
Abstract injury is not enough. The plaintiff must show that he 'has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury'
as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of
injury must be both 'real and immediate,' not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical.' 1
29
While conceding that Lyons had standing to sue for damages based on his
past injury at the hands of the police, the Court held, "'[p]ast exposure to illegal
conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive
relief... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects."",130 Lyons
could not show that he was in a real and immediate danger of being arrested and
choked by the police in the future.' 3' Addressing the argument that the denial of
standing would hinder a challenge to such police practices, the Court stated, "[t]he
legality of the violence to which Lyons claims he was once subjected is at issue in
his suit for damages and can be determined there.' ' 132 In short, Adolph Lyons could
126. 461 U.S. 95, 114 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 97-98.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 101-02 (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 102 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)).
131. Id. at 105. This is quite an odd requirement to impose on a plaintiff: that he or she predict or
establish the likelihood of his or her own future criminal conduct. Markey, supra note 11l, at 194.
132. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. For an incisive criticism of the Lyons reasoning, see LAWRENCE H.
TRIBE, I AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 411-13 (3d ed. 2000). As Professor Tribe points out, Lyons
"demonstrates the extreme and unprecedented nature of the Court's rejection of completed harm as
constituting an 'injury in fact' and of its demand for certainty of future injuries before a party may seek
injunctive relief." Id. at 411. Tribe points to a number of examples where a lawsuit would have to be
dismissed pursuant to the Lyons reasoning: "Most ballot access cases seeking prospective relief would
have to be dismissed after the election at issue was held since no one could ever prove with near
certainty that the candidates would indeed seek access in a future election, would meet all legitimate
access requirements, and would be denied access for illegitimate reasons." Id. at 411-12 (citation
omitted). Cases involving voting rights, abortion, durational residency, and affirmative action would,
under Lyons, be dismissed because the main event (an election, a pregnancy, living somewhere, or
pressing for admission to a program) would have long passed by the time the plaintiff got to court. See
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not get an injunction to stop future choking, but could get damages for the past
harm done by the one incident of choking.
Guided by the Supreme Court's Lyons decision, the lower federal courts
issued a number of rulings involving Deaf patients in the medical setting. The
decisions fall into two categories. The first category holds that Deaf plaintiffs lack
standing because they cannot show the threat of imminent future injury despite
injury arising out of the past discriminatory practices of a doctor or hospital.' 33 The
second category holds that Deaf plaintiffs injured by past discriminatory practices
have standing because they were able to establish, inter alia, that defendants
refused to change their policies and/or practices.
134
A. Standing Denied-No Imminent Future Injury
The actual cases that have produced this discouraging body of law illustrate
the recurrent difficulties and obstacles faced by Deaf patients in the medical setting.
For example, in Aikins v. St. Helena Hospital, the plaintiffs husband suffered a
massive heart attack that left him brain-dead.13 The hospital failed to provide the
Deaf plaintiff with interpreters during the crisis, and it was not until the Aikins'
daughter, a fluent signer, arrived on the scene four days later that Mrs. Aikins was
able to communicate effectively with the doctor overseeing her husband's care.136
Plaintiff, joined by the California Association of the Deaf, sued the hospital and the
id. at 411-12. Tribe concludes that the fact that standing did not stop these cases "suggests that Lyons
must be understood in large part as a decision of substantive law." Id. at 412. (citation omitted).
133. Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No. 95 CV 4549 SJ, 2007 WL 805802, at *1, *9
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2007); Connors v. W. Orange Healthcare Dist., No. 605CV647ORL31KRS, 2005
WL 1500899, at *1, *4 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2005); Constance v. State Univ. of N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr.,
166 F. Supp. 2d 663, 664, 667 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Freydel v. N.Y. Hosp., No. 97 CIV. 7926(SHS), 2000
WL 10264, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2000), aff'd, 242 F.3d 365, No. 00-7108, 2000 WL 1836755 (2d
Cir. Dec. 13, 2000); Bravin v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 186 F.R.D. 293, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Davis v.
Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d. 776, 780, 784 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Falls v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., No.
Civ.A. 97-1545, 1999 WL 33485550, at *1, *6 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 1999); Proctor v. Prince George's
Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 821, 825 (D. Md. 1998); Naiman v. N.Y. Univ., No. 95 CIV.
6469(LMM), 1997 WL 249970, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1997); Schroedel v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr.,
885 F. Supp. 594, 596, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329, 1332-33
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
134. Gillespie v. Dimensions Health Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 636, 643-44 (D. Md. 2005) (holding
that plaintiffs established standing for injunctive relief when defendant's pattern and practice is to deny
interpreters and plaintiffs are likely to seek treatment from defendant in the future); See Majocha v.
Turner, 166 F. Supp. 2d. 316, 324-25 (W.D. Pa. 2001) ("[W]here a public accommodation in the health
care field adheres to its policies of refusing to provide the requested auxiliary aid or has denied
treatment altogether to an individual who seeks to receive treatment at the facility, injunctive relief may
be available.").
135. 843 F. Supp. at 1331-32.
136. Id.
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doctor. The defendants sought to dismiss the case, alleging that the plaintiff
Association lacked standing.1
37
Citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Aikins Court found that the individual
plaintiff, Mrs. Aikins, lacked standing because she failed to demonstrate a "real and
immediate threat" of future harm required by Lyons.' 38 The Court stated that, "Mrs.
Aikins has shown neither that she is likely to use the hospital in the near future, nor
that defendants are likely to discriminate against her when she does use the
hospital."'' 39 The Court found that the California Association of the Deaf also
lacked standing to sue because Mrs. Aikins lacked standing. 1
40
In Bravin v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, Jeff Bravin and his wife, Naomi, a
Deaf couple, asked for a sign language interpreter at Lamaze birthing classes at Mt.
Sinai Medical Center, contending that without an interpreter, the husband would
not be able to understand the classes and would be denied an equal opportunity to
benefit from the instruction. 14' The hospital rejected the husband's requests for an
interpreter on the ground that he was not the patient. 142 The hospital contended its
offer of a text telephone for the hearing impaired (TTY) to the husband was
sufficient to meet its obligation under the law and argued that plaintiff could not
"premise his claim of intentional discrimination upon his preference for an ASL
interpreter over a TTY."
143
Conceding that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to demonstrate
that, if the Bravins returned to Mt. Sinai, the hospital would fail to provide
plaintiffs with effective communication, the Court nonetheless held that plaintiffs
failed to establish a "real and immediate" threat of future harm: "The Bravins must
show that there is a likelihood that they will require the services of Mt. Sinai in the
near future." 1
4 4
137. Id. at 1331. Oddly enough, the defendants conceded that Mrs. Aikens had standing to bring the
action against them, but the Court stated that it had an obligation to consider whether the wife had
standing because standing "goes to the Court's jurisdiction." Id. at 1333 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
138. Aikins, 843 F. Supp. at 1333.
139. Id. at 1333-34.
140. Id. at 1334.
141. 186 F.R.D. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The hospital agreed to provide an interpreter for the birth
itself. Id. at 297. Once the baby was born, the hospital transferred him to the neo-natal intensive care
unit, where his father again requested an interpreter, and the hospital once again refused on the ground
he was not the patient. Id.
142. Id. at 296.
143. Id. at 302.
144. Id. at 299. Although Bravin was denied standing for injunctive relief, the Court did find the
hospital liable for failing to provide an interpreter for the Lamaze birthing class. Id. at 304-05. This was
an empty victory because, on the one hand, Bravin had no standing to obtain an injunction, and, on the
other hand, the ADA does not contain a provision for damages for individual plaintiffs who have been
aggrieved by a defendant's failure to comply with the law. See Markey, supra note I 11, at 200.
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Connors v. West Orange Healthcare District involved plaintiffs Jennifer
Connors, her husband Robert, and Dawn Borque Rochette, three Deaf residents of
Maitland, Florida. Jennifer Connors and Dawn Rochette sought emergency medical
attention at the defendant's facility and were denied qualified sign language
interpreters. 45 Plaintiffs alleged that due to the lack of interpreters, they were
unable to communicate with or understand the defendant's medical personnel, who
insisted on writing notes to communicate with the Deaf patients rather than calling
for an interpreter. 146 Consequently, plaintiffs alleged that they were deprived of the
ability to understand the treatment provided and the procedures performed. 47 In
addition, plaintiffs contended they signed forms they did not fully understand, and
that the defendant's employees did not explain the risks and benefits of the
treatments. 148
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground plaintiffs were not
entitled to injunctive relief because they failed to establish an injury-in-fact and a
likelihood of future injury. 149 The Court laid out the standard for injunctive relief:
an injury-in-fact, a causal connection between the injury and defendant's action, the
likelihood or lack thereof of a real and immediate threat of future harm, and the
likelihood of redressability by a favorable decision.' 5° The plaintiffs lacked
standing because they said they would likely not return to defendant unless it was
an emergency:
The Plaintiffs have not alleged that they anticipate returning to receive
treatment from the Defendant at any point, whether for ongoing
treatment related to their original visits or from some unrelated medical
issue. Instead, they base their allegation on the entirely speculative
potential of a future medical emergency, and have not alleged that such
future medical conditions are likely to, or may possibly, arise. 151
145. Connors v. W. Orange Healthcare Dist., No. 605CV647ORL3IKRS, 2005 WL 1500899, at *1
(M.D. Fla. June 23, 2005).
146. Id. at*] -2.
147. Id. at *2.
148. Id. Plaintiffs' legal claims included the following: Count I contended that defendant violated
Title II of the ADA by "(1) failing to maintain policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the
ADA; (2) failing to ensure that communications with Plaintiffs were as effective as communications
with non-disabled patients; (3) failing to provide auxiliary aids and services; (4) failing to provide notice
of the Plaintiffs' rights; and (5) excluding the Plaintiffs from, and denying them the benefits of, services
due to their disability." Id. at *3. Count 2 focused on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
794 (2000), including a contention that defendants "refused to accommodate the Plaintiffs with
appropriate auxiliary aids and services." Id. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment condemning
defendant's practices and policies, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages. Id.
149. Id. at *3.
150. Id. at *4.
151. Id. The Court never explained why the possibility of an emergency did not confer standing on
the plaintiffs. See id. at * 1-7.
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Because the plaintiffs did not establish the likelihood of returning to the
defendant for treatment, the Court held that they failed to establish "a real and
immediate threat of future harm" and consequently lacked standing to pursue
injunctive relief. 1
52
In Constance v. State University of New York Health Science Center, the
plaintiffs, a Deaf husband and wife, sued the defendant hospital, alleging that the
hospital failed to provide them with sign language interpreter services in violation
of the ADA and requested injunctive relief.153 Despite the plaintiffs' contention that
they would likely return to the hospital, the Court concluded that "[p]laintiffs'
arguments are conclusory and do not have a factual basis."' 154 This was because:
[i]n the past, Mrs. Constance received treatment for cancer at a hospital
in Watertown, New York. In fact, she has never utilized the services at
Defendant Hospital prior to or since the incident giving rise to this
action. It would be speculative to assume that Mrs. Constance will again
suffer a medical emergency while in Syracuse and would again be
transported to SUNY HSC for treatment. Furthermore, in light of Mrs.
Constance's choice to seek treatment for her cancer with her oncologist
in Watertown, it is speculative to assume that should her cancer return
she would decide to seek treatment at Defendant's facilities.'55
Because the Constances failed to demonstrate a real and immediate threat of
future injury, they lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief. 56
Similarly, in Falls v. Prince George's Hospital Center, the plaintiffs, a
hearing mother and her young Deaf daughter, sued Prince George's Hospital
Center in Maryland, alleging that it discriminated against the daughter because it
failed to provide an interpreter during her nearly one-week-long stay at the
hospital. 157 Defendant moved for summary judgment, and the Court granted the
motion pursuant to the ADA because the Deaf child lacked standing to sue for
injunctive relief: 158
152. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
153. 166 F. Supp. 2d 663, 664 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (citations omitted). The Public Interest Law Firm
(now known as the Disability Rights Clinic), a law school clinic at the Syracuse University College of
Law, filed this suit. See id.; OFFICE OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: 2005-2006 ANNUAL REPORT 6,
available at http://www.law.syr.edu/Pdfs/0OCLE_2005-2006Annual%20Report.pdf Syracuse
University College of Law, In-house Clinics,
http://www.law.syr.edu/academics/clinicaleducation/inhouse-clinics.aspx (last visited March 13, 2008).
154. Constance, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 666-67.
155. Id. at 667.
156. Id.
157. No. Civ.A. 97-1545, 1999 WL 33485550, at *3-5 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 1999). The claims were
brought under the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000), and Maryland
state law (intentional infliction of emotional distress). Id. at *1.
158. Id. at *l, *5-6.
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[Plaintiff] is unable to establish that she herself faces a real and
immediate threat of future harm from Defendant, and not merely a
conjectural or hypothetical threat. By now, over two years have passed
since [plaintiff] was discharged from PGHC. The present record neither
reflects any on-going discrimination by Defendant against [plaintiff],
nor that she is likely to return to PGHC in the near future. Indeed,
[plaintiff's mother] stated in her deposition that she does not want to use
the services of PGHC again, even if [plaintiff] is "near death."'' 59
In Freydel v. New York Hospital, plaintiff, an elderly Deaf Russian woman,
asserted standing on two grounds: she had numerous chronic conditions requiring
future medical attention, and her local community hospital was part of a medical
network including defendant New York Hospital as a tertiary care center. 160
Plaintiff argued that both grounds meant "that future referrals to New York
Hospital for specialized treatment are possible."'161 That was still not enough to
confer standing on the elderly plaintiff. Her visit "was a single, fortuitous event that
is unlikely to recur;" there were eleven tertiary care centers closer to plaintiffs
home than New York Hospital; and plaintiffs primary care physician, was no
longer employed by the defendant's cardiac catheterization unit, which "sever[ed]
[plaintiffs] previous link with the institution.' ' 162 The Court denied standing:
One visit to a hospital does not establish that Mrs. Freydel is likely to
again find herself seeking treatment at New York Hospital. The
relationship between New York Community Hospital (i.e., Mrs.
Freydel's community hospital) and defendant New York Hospital is too
weak a basis to establish a real or imminent need for her to utilize the
defendant hospital in the future. Mrs. Freydel has failed to provide
evidence of a likely future encounter between herself and defendant.
63
In Loeffler v. Staten Island University Hospital, the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they failed to present "any evidence to show that Josephine [was] currently
receiving treatment at the Hospital, or that she suffer[ed] from a condition that
might require treatment at the Hospital in the future."' 164 However, ten years passed
between the events leading to the lawsuit and the Court's decision, and in that time
the hospital amended its sign language interpreter policies to address the plaintiffs'
concerns. 165 Accordingly, even if the plaintiffs had standing to press their petition
159. Id. at *6.
160. No. 97 CIV. 7926(SHS), 2000 WL 10264, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2000), affd, 242 F.3d
365, No. 00-7108, 2000 WL 1836755 (2d Cir. Dec. 13, 2000).
161. Id. at *3.
162. Id. at *3-4.
163. Id. The Court pointed to the fact New York Hospital subsequently amended its policy to
provide Deaf patients with an interpreter. Id. at *3.
164. No. 95 CV 4549 SJ, 2007 WL 805802, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2007) (emphasis in original).
165. Id. at *10.
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for injunctive relief, a recurring violation of their rights, should they return to the
hospital, appeared unlikely.'
1 66
In Naiman v. New York University, the Court conceded that plaintiffs
allegation of four visits to the defendant's hospital was sufficient, for pleading
purposes, to demonstrate that, if the plaintiff were to return to defendant's hospital,
it would again fail to provide him with effective communication access. 167
However, the Court held it was not sufficient to satisfy plaintiffs burden to
demonstrate standing by showing a real or immediate threat that plaintiff "will
require the services of [defendant's hospital] in the future."1 68 Plaintiff presented no
evidence to show that he would require the services of the hospital in the future, but
he was given leave to amend the complaint to show likelihood of future visits or be
barred from seeking an injunction. 161
Proctor v. Prince George's Hospital Center involved a Deaf plaintiff injured
in a motorcycle accident who faced amputation surgery-despite repeated requests
for an interpreter to help facilitate communication about the surgery and its
attendant risks, no interpreter was provided until the second surgery. 170 The Court
found no standing because there was neither "any on-going discrimination" against
plaintiff nor any showing that he was likely to return to the defendant's hospital. 171
Although the hospital amended its policy prior to the plaintiff's stay in order to
comply with the Office of Civil Rights of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services, the plaintiff alleged that they failed to apply it to him. 172 The
plaintiff did not challenge the policy's adequacy and did not demonstrate the
existence of any condition that made repeated violations likely if he were to return
to the defendant's hospital. 1
73
In Schroedel v. New York University Medical Center, the Court found that the
Deaf plaintiffs statements that she might experience a medical condition in the
future warranting emergency room assistance; that she would decide to use
defendant's hospital for this condition; and that defendant's hospital would
discriminate against her by failing to provide her with effective communication all
"amount[ed] to mere speculation." 17 4 Key in the Court's thinking was the fact that
defendant's hospital was "not the nearest medical center to either Schroedel's
166. Id.
167. No. 95 CIV. 6469(LMM), 1997 WL 249970, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1997).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823 (D. Md. 1998). Plaintiffs first two therapy sessions after the surgeries
were also not covered by sign language interpreters. Id. at 824.
171. Id. at 825.
172. Id. at 822, 825.
173. Id. at 825.
174. 885 F. Supp. 594, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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residence or place of employment."' 175 Also key was the fact that the plaintiff rarely
utilized the defendant hospital. 176 Plaintiff could not establish standing by
hypothesizing a chain of events "in which the action challenged eventually lead[] to
actual injury."'
177
One case took place in a psychological counseling clinic rather than a
hospital. Davis v. Flexman concerned the alleged failure of the clinic to provide
effective communication access to a Deaf couple struggling with marital strife. 178
The record reflected multiple requests on the part of the Deaf couple for sign
language interpreter services during counseling sessions, and Defendant Flexman's
repeated refusals to provide interpreters. 179 The evidence showed that despite being
told about the ADA and apparently being shown a copy of the statute, which he
either refused to or failed to read, Flexman continued to drag his feet regarding
meeting the communication needs of his patients. 180  Because the evidence
demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the defendant's
deliberate indifference to the Davises' communication needs, the Court denied the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on this issue.' 8
175. Id.
176. Id. Prior to the incident that led to the litigation, plaintiff had not been to defendant's hospital
since 1983, and prior to that time had not been there since 1976. Id. In fact, she sought medical
assistance on two occasions from a different hospital between 1983 and 1992. Id.
177. Id. (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 795 F.2d 195, 201 (D.C. Cir.
1986)). The Court also rejected Schroedel's argument that her claims fell within the exception to the
Article III standing requirement for cases that are deemed "capable of repetition yet evading review." Id.
(quoting Diotte v. Blum, 585 F. Supp. 887, 895 (N.D.N.Y. 1984)). The Court noted the Supreme Court's
ruling limiting the scope of this exception to two kinds of cases: one where the discrimination
challenged happened too quickly to be litigated before it stopped, and the other where there was a
reasonable expectation that the plaintiff would be subject to the same discrimination again. Id. (citing
Diotte, 585 F. Supp. at 895 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975))). The Court
found that "[a] mere physical or theoretical possibility of future injury is not sufficient to satisfy this
test." Id. at 599-600 (citing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)). Commentators have noted that
while the Supreme Court's standard for the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the
mootness doctrine is stringent, the Court has issued rulings in cases that were moot by the time they
reached the Court, the most famous example being Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Colker, supra
note 102, at 396.
178. 109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 780 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
179. Id. at 780-81.
180. Id. at 781, 791. Continuing to insist that the law imposed no obligation on him, Flexman
promised to provide a computer to help the Davises communicate with their therapist, but he never did.
Id.
181. Id. at 791, 808. What is interesting about this case is the Court's tortured interpretation of
Ohio's anti-discrimination statute, Ohio Administrative Code Chapter 4112-5, promulgated by the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission, which defines unlawful discrimination as the denial by a place of public
accommodation, on the basis of disability as "any term, condition, privilege, service or advantage which,
upon entrance to such facility, accrues to the public in general." Id. at 796-98 (quoting OHIO ADMIN.
CODE 4112-5-06(A)(2) (2006)); see OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4112-5-01 (2008) (noting that these rules
express the Ohio civil rights commission's interpretation of language in Chapter 4112 of the Revised
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However, the Court denied plaintiff standing to sue for injunctive relief:
Neither Julia nor Steven Davis currently visits the Flexman Clinic, and
they do not intend to return in the future. In addition, the Davises have
no plans to seek counseling from anyone other than [Joanne] Voelkel,
and she no longer is affiliated with the Flexman Clinic . . . . Absent
some evidence indicating that the Davises are likely to resume marital
counseling at the Clinic, [plaintiff] lacks standing to seek injunctive
relief. '82
The courts in these cases analyzed the incidents of discrimination as isolated
incidents that had no context, no history, no rhyme or reason other than being just
an unfortunate incident that happened to one person at one time, unlikely to occur
in the future. The lens that the courts use is myopic: all the judges see is a single
plaintiff experiencing one incident of discrimination, and they do not have the
slightest inkling that these single incidents are part and parcel of a much larger
problem affecting more than just one individual. If the courts had any insight into
the experiences of Deaf plaintiffs (and people with other disabilities), they would
quickly realize that the single incident of discrimination (denial of effective
communication access) indicates an ongoing pattern and practice so systemically
engaged in by the medical profession. At least a few judges get it, as the following
section shows.
B. Standing Granted-Refusal To Change Policy or Practice
Where there is evidence that the defendants refused to change their policies or
practices, courts have been more willing to grant standing to Deaf plaintiffs injured
by past discriminatory practices. In Gillespie v. Dimensions Health Corp., the
plaintiffs were forced to communicate through written notes and lip reading despite
Code). Plaintiffs contended that Flexman's failure to provide interpreters violated this section of Ohio
law, and the Court rejected this claim. Davis, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 796 ("On its face, this regulation states
only that a place of public accommodation may not, because of an individual's handicap, deny that
person any term, condition, privilege, service, or advantage that is available to the public in general. In
the present case, the Defendants did not deny Julia Davis their counseling services. Rather, she found
the services unsatisfactory in the absence of an interpreter.") (emphasis added)). The Court fails to
understand that the absence of an interpreter resulted in the denial of counseling services. Indeed, the
Court disregarded or forgot Joanne Voelkel's deposition in which she stated that when plaintiffs brought
their own interpreter, at their expense, the presence of the interpreter "had been beneficial." Id. at 780-
81. This conclusion represents a stunning ignorance of the plaintiffs' communication needs and an
inability to understand that opening the door to the clinic without an interpreter served as a barrier as
real as a wall or curb for wheelchair users. Substitute "wheelchair user" for the Deaf plaintiff, and you
can see the ridiculousness of the Court's logic: The clinic's failure to ramp its entrance door did not
deny plaintiff her counseling services. Rather, she found the services unsatisfactory in the absence of a
ramp. Cf id. at 796 (analogizing wheelchair users to the Court's tautological argument that Defendants
did not deny Plaintiffs their counseling services, but, rather, the services were unsatisfactory in the
absence of an interpreter). The services were "unsatisfactory" because the plaintiff could not get in.
182. Davis, 109 F. Supp. at 784 (citations to depositions omitted).
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repeated requests for a sign language interpreter. 83 The defendant relied on the
Proctor and Falls cases as support for the proposition that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to pursue injunctive relief, but the Court distinguished the cases, pointing
to the lack of on-going discrimination against the previous plaintiffs, the fact the
hospitals in the previous cases amended their policies to include sign language
interpreters, and the remote likelihood of plaintiffs returning to the hospitals.184 By
contrast, Gillespie involved "multiple plaintiffs, some of whom are alleging
multiple violations on multiple occasions."' 185 Also, the defendant never provided
the plaintiffs with an interpreter despite repeated requests, and "the Video Relay
Interpreting (VRI) device the hospital sparingly attempted to utilize was utterly
ineffective."' 186 The Gillespie plaintiffs also alleged in their complaint that they
"sought and received, and will likely continue to seek medical treatment" from the
defendant's facility, a fact which was buttressed by the proximity of the
defendant's facility to the plaintiffs' homes. 187 Finally, the Gillespie plaintiffs
alleged that they were injured, and would likely continue to be injured, by the
defendant's "policies, pattern, and practice."' 188 The Court held:
Given that Plaintiffs have alleged that it is the policy, pattern, and
practice of [defendant] to not provide live, in-person, qualified sign
interpreters, but rather to resort to occasional and sporadic note-taking,
and to a VRI device that its staff is allegedly improperly and
inadequately trained on, and which on numerous occasions proved
ineffective due to the quality of the picture, it is likely that Plaintiffs will
be harmed again if and when, as they allege, they return to
[defendant]. 1
89
Given the allegation of an existing policy that violated the plaintiffs' ADA
rights, and buttressed by evidence that the defendant never provided interpreters,
the plaintiffs' desire to use the hospital, and the hospital's proximity to plaintiffs'
183. 369 F. Supp. 2d 636, 637 (D. Md. 2005).
184. Id. at 641-42. The Court also discussed the Constance-Freydel-Schroedel-Naiman line of cases,
finding that plaintiffs in these cases were not able to demonstrate sufficient nexus to the defendant to
justify standing. Id. at 643-44, 644 n.7.
185. Id. at 642.
186. Id. In response to plaintiffs' requests for an interpreter, the hospital insisted on providing a
Video Relay Interpreting device where a sign language interpreter is at a remote location and, through
videoconferencing, the Deaf individual and the interpreter can see each other on a TV screen. Id. at 638
n.2. The interpreter voices what the Deaf person is signing, and signs what the hearing people in the
room are saying. Id. at 638 n.2. The device was not always available to plaintiffs, and the hospital,
instead of providing interpreters, "insisted on speaking verbally to Gillespie and Irvine despite the fact
that Irvine cannot read lips and Gillespie's ability to read lips was compromised by her medical
condition." Id. at 638. Interpreters were never provided. Id. at 637, 639.
187. Id. at 642.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 643.
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homes, the Court found that the Gillespie plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated a real
and immediate threat of future injury to support standing to seek injunctive
relief.' 90
In Majocha v. Turner, the defendants were a group of ear, nose, and throat
doctors operating as the Pittsburgh Ear, Nose and Throat Associates, and the
plaintiffs were a Deaf man and his infant son who was brought in for treatment of
an ear infection. 191 In response to the plaintiffs wife's request for a sign language
interpreter for her husband during the consultation, the defendants sent the family a
letter, advising them to go elsewhere for their son's treatment.' 92 Plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and
attorney's fees under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the
defendants moved for summary judgment. 193 The Court held that, although
injunctive relief was generally not available for a single instance of refusal to
provide auxiliary aids and services to a plaintiff who has not alleged or
demonstrated a likelihood of seeking treatment in the future,194 it may still be
available when a physician's office like the defendants' adheres to a policy of
refusing to provide the requested auxiliary aid or service, or denies treatment
altogether to an individual like the plaintiff. 195 Because the plaintiff had chronic ear
infections that were likely to recur "and may require additional surgical
procedures," but could not avail himself of the defendant's services because of the
defendant's steadfast refusal to provide effective communication, the Court allowed
the plaintiff standing to proceed for injunctive relief. 1
96
It is difficult to see how the discrimination in Constance or Proctor, cases
where the Deaf plaintiff lost standing, differs from the discrimination in Majocha
190. Id. at 645.
191. 166 F. Supp. 2d 316,318-19 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
192. Id. at 318.
193. Id. at 319.
194. Id. at 324 (citing Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329, 1333-34 (N.D. Cal.1994)
(Aikins 1)).
195. Id. at 325 (citing Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., No. C 93-3933 FMS, 1994 WL 794759, at *3-4
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 04, 1994) (Aikins II)). In the follow-up to Aikins I, the district court permitted plaintiff
to amend her complaint "to allege that she stayed at her mobile home near the defendant hospital several
times a year," which made it "reasonably likely that she would seek to use its medical services in the
future, and that the hospital engaged in a pattern and practice of denying equal access to the hearing
impaired;" see also Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 146 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85 (D. Me. 2001), affid, 333
F.3d 299 (1st Cir. 2003) (injunction available where defendant refused to revise its discriminatory
policies against plaintiff on the basis of his alleged disability; plaintiff is not required to perform a futile
act of seeking the services again); Merchant v. Kring, 50 F. Supp. 2d 433, 434-35 (W.D. Pa. 1999)
(injunctive relief available where dentist refused treatment of patient and required patient to submit to an
HIV test); Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1166-67 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (plaintiff may seek
injunctive relief under Title IIl of ADA where doctor refused to treat her because she did not want to
provide a sign language interpreter and had not revised her policies).
196. Majocha, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 325.
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or Gillespie, where the Deaf plaintiff won standing. In the former, the courts ruled
that the discrimination happened in the past, and that the plaintiff would probably
not return to the doctor or hospital. 197 In the latter, the courts found an ongoing
practice of discrimination that would likely affect the plaintiff in the future. As the
experiences of the fifteen Deaf patients recounted earlier illustrates, denial of an
appropriate auxiliary aid made access difficult, if not impossible. 1 98 What differs in
the "game" of standing is how the courts frame the facts. This does not seem to
square with the broad mandate of the ADA to combat the kind of discrimination
that Deaf patients experience on a daily basis in the medical setting. What is needed
is new thinking about an old problem.
IV. RETHINKING STANDING FOR DEAF PATIENTS
The law of standing, as fleshed out in the Supreme Court's decisions and the
lower courts' reading of these decisions, poses a problem for the Deaf community.
Deaf patients lose standing to sue the medical provider under the ADA because
they will not, or are unable to, return to the provider's office. To the courts, there is
no case or controversy for resolution if the Deaf patient does not return to the
doctor's office or hospital. 199 But why would anyone return to a doctor or hospital
that refused or failed to meet his or her most basic communication needs? 20
0
Indeed, why would the law demand that Deaf patients return to a setting where
physicians resisted accommodating their communication needs? 20 Why would the
law demand that Deaf patients undergo the frustration of repeated denials and the
prospect of ongoing litigation to enforce a recognized right to effective
communication? Most importantly, what prevents the law from construing a
medical provider's failure or refusal to provide appropriate auxiliary aids as either
an actual and present injury or a "certainly impending" injury-in-fact sufficient to
support standing?
20 2
The problem of access to medical care for Deaf patients is acute. The research
demonstrates that many, if not most, of the interviewees encountered physician
resistance to accommodating their communication needs.20 3 Despite the fact that
197. See supra text accompanying notes 154-57, 170-73.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 56-78.
199. See, e.g., Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317, 320, 323 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that plaintiff
did not have standing to sue for injunctive relief under the ADA because plaintiff did not demonstrate a
realistic possibility of future discriminatory conduct on the part of defendant that would harm her).
200. See Markey, supra note 11l, at 209 (citing Colker, supra note 102, at 398) ("In the context of
personal services, it is unlikely that anyone would engage the services of a provider again after the
provider had engaged in blatant discrimination, since other providers are usually available.").
201. Contra 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2000).
202. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990).
203. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 71-130. In addition to the author's research study, other studies on
this issue have yielded similar results. See, e.g., Barnett, Cross-Cultural Communication, supra note 6,
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the law entitles Deaf patients to effective communication access in the medical
setting, which means they must be given appropriate auxiliary aids such as sign
language interpreters free of charge, physician resistance is pervasive. Many
doctors either do not understand their legal obligations under the ADA or are not
willing to absorb the cost of providing an appropriate auxiliary aid, particularly if it
is a sign language interpreter.2 °4 Yet, the law of standing frustrates many patients
who attempt to secure their rights in court. A close reading of the Supreme Court's
standing decisions and subsequent case law demonstrates an alternative way of
framing the problem so that Deaf patients and patients with other disabilities can
retain standing to press their claims under the ADA.
A. Allowing Deaf Patients Standing as an Ongoing Injury Would Be Consistent
with the Supreme Court's Lyons and Lujan Decisions
Allowing a Deaf plaintiff standing, even when that person has no plans to go
back to the medical provider, is consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in
Lyons and Lujan. In Lyons, the African-American plaintiff did not have standing
because he could not demonstrate the likelihood that he would not only be stopped
for a traffic violation, but also subjected to a punitive chokehold without
provocation.0 5 However, unlike the likelihood of suffering a chokehold, which
required that the plaintiff expect repeated police misconduct in response to his
future criminal conduct, the likelihood of a recurring and prevalent injury exists
where a Deaf patient engaging in lawful conduct encounters a doctor's refusal to
provide the patient with appropriate auxiliary aids (usually an interpreter) so that
at 377 (finding that the overall results of the studies indicate that Deaf people experience difficulty
communicating with physicians and have less health knowledge than hearing individuals); Barnett,
Clinical and Cultural Issues, supra note 6, at 21 ("Deaf people frequently report that physicians do not
understand them, and they are less likely to try to explain themselves again than are non-English
speaking immigrants."); Harmer, supra note 9, at 79 (noting that Deaf and hard of hearing individuals
have a poorer self-reported health status than the general population); Nemon, supra note 8, at 20 ("The
primary theme was, predictably, communication."); Steinberg et al., supra note 28, at 983 (noting that
"participants felt that professionals accept a minimal level of communication with Deaf clients that
would never be tolerated with hearing patients").
204. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 (2007). Sign language interpreters are not cheap. An interpreter certified by
the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, a national certifying organization of interpreters, can charge up
to $70 or $80 an hour with a two-hour minimum. See, e.g., Judgment Underscores Hospitals' Need to
Help Deaf Patients, Families, HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. (AHC Media, Atlanta, G.A.), June 1999,
available at http://www.ahcpub.com/hottopics/?htid=l&httid=1417 (stating that in New York a sign
language interpreter charges approximately $70 for two hours); Schwartz, supra note 30, at 273. It is
generally higher in the major cities of the United States and lower in suburban and rural areas. However,
the yardstick for measuring the reasonableness of the interpreter's fee is not what the doctor charges for
the visit, but rather, the doctor's annual income. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2007) (defining the reasonableness
standards of "readily achievable" and "undue burden" as considering "the overall financial resources of
the site or sites involved in the action.").
205. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983).
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the patient has effective communication access. 20 6 The Deaf patient will encounter
the communication barrier every time he or she attempts to visit the medical
practice and the practice adheres steadfastly to its refusal to provide interpreters.20 7
Further, as the late Professor Adam Milani noted, "every other person with the
same disability will also encounter that barrier."
20 8
The Court's decision in Lujan can also be distinguished. In that case, the
plaintiffs were traveling to foreign lands to study the environment, and their
affidavits indicated an intent to return "some day" without specifying a return
date.20 9 The Court said, "[s]uch 'some day' intentions-without any description of
concrete plans, or indeed even any speculation of when the some day will be-do
not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require., 210
On the contrary, a Deaf plaintiff does not contend that he or she will some day
return to a distant land, but rather the neighborhood doctor's office or hospital
when an appropriate auxiliary aid becomes available.21' When a medical provider
makes it known that he or she is communication accessible to Deaf patients on an
ongoing basis, these patients will likely return.
21 2
206. Colker, supra note 102, at 397. Recall the Justice Department's admonition: "It is not difficult
to imagine a wide range of communications involving areas such as health, legal matters, and finances
that would be sufficiently lengthy or complex to require an interpreter for effective communication." 28
C.F.R. § 36.303 app. B at 715 (2007).
207. It flies in the face of human experience, common sense and logic to expect that a medical
provider would change course voluntarily and willingly once he or she refused to provide an interpreter.
Deaf patients interviewed in the author's dissertation study recounted numerous efforts, to no avail, to
convince the provider to change his or her mind about the initial refusal to provide an interpreter.
Schwartz, supra note 30, at 129-33.
208. Adam A. Milani, Wheelchair Users Who Lack "Standing": Another Procedural Threshold
Blocking Enforcement of Titles H and III of the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 69, 113 (2004).
Discrimination against a discrete or insular group of people based on a shared characteristic like
deafness enables the Attorney General of the United States to bring suit to stop the discriminatory
behavior. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B) (2000).
209. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1992).
210. Id. at 564.
211. See Milani, supra note 208, at 114 ("Unlike Lujan, plaintiffs in most ADA actions are not
alleging that they might some day return to a far off land. They are stating that they will go to
restaurants, stores, and health care providers near their homes when the accessibility problems are
corrected or discriminatory policies are changed."); see, e.g., Clark v. McDonald's Corp., 213 F.R.D.
198, 229 (D.N.J. 2003) (holding that a wheelchair user had standing when he stated that he would return
if the defendant removed architectural barriers to the premises); Disabled in Action v. Trump Int'l Hotel
& Tower, No. 01 Civ. 5518(MBM), 2003 WL 1751785, at *8-9 (Apr. 2, 2003 S.D.N.Y.) (wheelchair-
using plaintiffs stated, we "are not the type of 'some day' intentions rejected in [Lujan]," and the Court
granted them standing to pursue an action to compel a restaurant to provide a wheelchair lift).
212. Professor Cass Sunstein criticizes the Lujan decision as "a form of Lochner-style substantive
due process." Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article
111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 236 (1992). Professor Sunstein argues that "an injury in fact is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for standing .... It assumes that there can be a factual inquiry into
'injury' independent of evaluation and of legal conventions. There can be no such law-free inquiry." Id.
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B. The Denial of an Interpreter Should be Construed as an Actual and Present
Injury
A plaintiff with a disability bringing an action to compel accessibility should
not be required to demonstrate the imminence of a future injury because he or she
has an actual and present injury-the barrier to entry to a place of public
accommodation. t 3 Thus, according to Professor Milani, Lujan's requirement of
"imminence" is "unnecessary to the extent [the plaintiff] seeks injunctive relief to
remedy today's 'actual harm,' or 'continuing, present adverse effects' from his past
exposure to [the defendant's] allegedly illegal conduct., 214
Furthermore, the ADA explicitly states, "[n]othing in this section shall require
a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual
notice that a person or organization covered by this subchapter does not intend to
comply with its provisions. 21 5 This provision allows a plaintiff who knows of a
barrier to a place of public accommodation to avoid making a futile gesture of
trying to gain access "because the injury continues for as long as they are deterred
from patronizing a public accommodation due to the discriminatory conditions
which continue to persist at the establishment. 2 1 6 Deaf people draw on local
knowledge; i.e., the community's pool of information regarding the larger world,
including doctors and the law. 217 For instance, some patients ask around in the Deaf
community to find a doctor that is sensitive or aware of the needs of Deaf patients.
Some patients go to Deaf clubs and meetings of Deaf people to learn more about
laws that impact the medical setting. The Deaf community shares a sense of culture
through ASL, which constitutes a continuum of language ranging from traditional
sign language to Signed English.21 8 It is through this culture that Deaf patients learn
who is providing effective communication access and who is not.219
According to Professor Sunstein, "[d]espite the holding of Lujan, Congress should be permitted to grant
standing to citizens." Id. Sunstein's argument attacks the requirement of injury-in-fact as not being
rooted in the Constitution, common law, and history, and asserts that as long as Congress grants a
statutory right, a plaintiff within the scope of that right has an interest that supports standing. Id.
213. See Milani, supra note 208, at 117-18.
214. Id. (citations omitted).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2000); see 28 C.F.R. § 36.501 (2007) (clarifying that the subchapter
referred to in the statute is Title III of the ADA); Pickem v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133,
1136 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying this provision of Title Ill of the ADA).
216. Milani, supra note 208, at 118 (citing Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1136-37).
217. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 300.
218. See Susan Mather & Robert Mather, Court Interpreting for Signing Jurors: Just Transmitting
or Interpreting?, in LANGUAGE AND THE LAW IN DEAF COMMUNITIES 60, 67-68 (2003).
219. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 300 ("In addition to sign language, there are traditions, rituals, and
other indicia of community that give expression to a feeling of identity with the Deaf World-a sense of
'us' versus 'them,' the latter being the hearing world. This sense of "us v. them" is heightened in the
doctor's office where doctors hold traditional views of Deaf people's competence-the inability to
speak equals incompetence, and the ability to sign, too, equals incompetence. This sense of alienation is
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Even if the plaintiff does not plan to return, "courts should be 'reluctant to
embrace a rule of standing that would allow an alleged wrongdoer to evade the
court's jurisdiction so long as he does not injure the same person twice. " 220 When
a doctor rejects a Deaf patient's request for an appropriate auxiliary aid, such as a
sign language interpreter, the law should interpret the rejection as actual notice the
doctor does not intend to comply with the ADA. Otherwise, to demand proof of the
likelihood of a future violation "would create a standard far more demanding than
that contemplated by the Congressional objectives that influenced the ADA.",22 1
Indeed, the refusal to change policies regarding the provision of auxiliary aids
or services to people with disabilities is, by its nature, an "ongoing and not
isolated" violation.222 A plaintiff with a disability should have standing to seek
injunctive relief because the refusal constitutes evidence that discrimination is an
on-going problem and is likely to recur in the future.223 For example, spurred by the
complaint of a Deaf patient that a large medical practice operating in three counties
refused to provide effective communication access (i.e., sign language interpreters)
to patients, investigators for the Civil Rights Bureau of the New York State
Attorney General's Office telephoned the clinic on two separate occasions.224 The
office placed calls two weeks apart, and each call confirmed what the Deaf patients
told the Attorney General's Office: the clinic refused to provide interpreters to Deaf
patients who needed the accommodation.225  When a place of public
accommodation employs a policy of discrimination, one refusal ought to establish
the likelihood of a future denial of aids or services, i.e., the likelihood of a future
injury.226
Another consideration in favor of allowing standing concerns the availability
of monetary damages for an injury. In Lyons, the Court emphasized that denial of
standing to pursue injunctive relief did not mean that the African-American
plaintiff would be out of luck-he would still be allowed to pursue damages for the
only reinforced when doctors use outdated terminology to refer to their patients: 'Deaf and dumb' or
'Deaf mute."').
220. Milani, supra note 208, at 119 (quoting Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp.
698, 762 (D. Ore. 1997)).
221. Dudley v. Hannaford Bros., 333 F.3d 299, 307 (1st Cir. 2003).
222. Milani, supra note 208, at 113.
223. Id. at 119.
224. People ex rel. Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. Group, 877 F. Supp. 143, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
225. Id. What happened in the Mid Hudson case was not unusual. Research by the author shows that
Deaf patients experienced repeated refusals by their physicians to provide interpreters to their patients.
Schwartz, supra note 30, at 128-34. Many of these patients received refusals on a number of occasions
before leaving the practice and going elsewhere. Id. at 128. Many federal cases are replete with the
stories of Deaf patients who struggled against ongoing refusals to provide interpreters. See cases cited
supra note I.
226. See Milani, supra note 208, at 119.
[VOL. 11:163
LIMITS ON INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE ADA
pain and suffering from the illegal chokehold.227 That is not the case with Title III
of the ADA. Injunctive relief generally is the only remedy for plaintiffs alleging
discrimination based on disability.2 Damages are not available under Title 111,229
and are available under Title II only if the plaintiff can prove intentional
discrimination. 23 0 This is fundamentally unfair to Deaf plaintiffs. A rule preventing
plaintiffs with disabilities from claiming damages to remedy an ADA violation
while simultaneously depriving them of the ability to obtain injunctive relief is





C. The Justice Department Has Its Limitations as an Enforcement Mechanism
Reliance on private enforcement of disability rights law is even more critical,
given the Justice Department's limited ability or desire to fully enforce the ADA.
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, a housing discrimination case brought
under Section 810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, teaches us that the Justice
Department has limited authority and resources to enforce compliance with the
law.23 2 In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1968
required "a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same
housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination .... ,,233 In coming to this
conclusion, the Court took notice of the Justice Department's limited staff for
227. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). "[W]ithholding injunctive relief does
not mean that the 'federal law will exercise no deterrent effect in these circumstances."' Id. at 112-23
(quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974)).
228. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) (2000) (remedies are limited
to injunctive relief, including a court order "requiring the provision of an auxiliary aid or service,
modification of a policy, or provision of alternative methods . .
229. Id. § 12188(a).
230. Id. § 12133 (adopting the "remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 505 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794(a)"). A few courts have held that the "deliberate
indifference" standard is the appropriate yardstick for determining the existence of intentional
discrimination. See, e.g., Garcia v. State Univ. of N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 115 (2d Cir.
2001); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). For an extended discussion of
the difficulty in proving "intentional discrimination," see Milani, supra note 208, at 115-17.
231. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 101ST CONG., REPORT ON AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 1485 (Comm. Print 1991) (statement of Howard Wolf, Partner, Fulbright &
Jaworski); see also Milani, supra note 208, at 117.
232. 409 U.S. 205, 206, 210-11 (1972). It appears that the Department of Justice places greater
emphasis on education rather than litigation. See Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An
Analysis of Title III andApplicable Case Law, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1117, 1141 (1995) ("[S]ettlement
agreements with the Department of Justice have resulted in many of the accomplishments of Title Ill.
Commentators reason that initial litigation has been sparse because the government has placed a greater
emphasis on education").
233. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212.
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enforcing the statute and the concurrent importance of private plaintiffs bringing
these cases. 234 As Professor Milani noted:
The statutory language in ADA Title III is remarkably similar to the
language in the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and the Department of Justice
has only limited staff to enforce not only it, but also Title I1 and section
504. Accordingly, courts should likewise give it a broad construction in
determining standing.
235
The Justice Department's civil rights enforcement suffers from several
problems. First, its Disability Rights Section in the Civil Rights Division has a
large agenda on its plate-not only is it responsible for enforcement of Titles II and
III of the ADA, but also Sections 504 and 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, and Executive Order
12250.236 Yet, as Professor Milani noted, "a recent report from the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights found that the Disability Rights Section initiated 701
investigations in fiscal year 2002, down 181 from fiscal year 2001, and filed
twenty-eight cases, down from thirty-seven." 237 More troubling, in its 1996 review
of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, the United States Commission
on Civil Rights found a lack of support from the Justice Department's Office of
Justice Programs (OJP) for civil rights enforcement.238 The Commission found that
civil rights was not a focus or a priority at the agency as the OJP organizational
234. Id. at 211.
235. Milani, supra note 208, at 107.
236. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div., A Guide to Disability Rights Laws (Sept. 2005),
available at http://www.ada.gov/cguide.pdf; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Disability Rights
Section Home Page, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/drs/drshome.htm (follow "Enforcement" hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 2, 2008). In 1980, President Carter signed Executive Order 12250, which provided for the
consistent and effective implementation of various laws prohibiting discriminatory practices on the basis
of race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or religion in programs and activities receiving federal
financial assistance. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 4, 1980). The responsibility for
implementing this Executive Order was placed with the Attorney General, who in turn assigned this
responsibility, except for the authority to approve regulations, to the Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Coordination & Review Section, Overview of
Executive Order 12250, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/12250.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2008). See
generally Colker, supra note 102, at 403-04 (reviewing the settlements obtained by the Department of
Justice and stating, "[w]hile the DOJ settlements appear to be effective, they are few in number.").
237. Milani, supra note 208, at 107 (citing Shannon McCaffrey, Civil Rights Division Backs Away
from Its Initial Activism, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 23, 2003, at A08).
238. 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN YEAR CHECK-UP: HAVE FEDERAL AGENCIES
RESPONDED TO CIVIL RIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS? 16 (2002), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/tenyrchekupvol2.pdf. As the Commission
reports, "[t]he Department remains the largest federal civil rights agency with additional responsibilities
in civil rights enforcement and coordination since the 1996 report. Civil rights is a priority as evidenced
by the placement of the Civil Rights Division within the Department. However, with so many statutes to
enforce and ever-evolving civil rights issues, effectively carrying out all its responsibilities remains a
serious challenge for the Department." Id. at 12.
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structure minimized the Office for Civil Rights' (OCR) authority and hindered
OCR's ability to fulfill its external civil rights responsibilities.239 In 2002, the
Commission found the situation to be the status quo.240
Furthermore, the statutory language of the ADA constricts the Attorney
General's power to sue on behalf of Deaf plaintiffs. Title III allows the Attorney
General to bring suit only in limited circumstances: against "(i) any person or group
of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination under this
subchapter; or (ii) any person or group of persons [that] has been discriminated
against under this subchapter and such discrimination raises an issue of general
public importance."24 1 As the Supreme Court noted in Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance, the "pattern or practice" language limits what the Attorney General
can do,242 and frequent litigation over this power ensued with a number of courts
dismissing the action when it found the Attorney General failed to show a pattern
or practice of discrimination.243 Quite aptly, the Court in Trafficante noted that
given "the enormity of the task of assuring [accessibility for disabled people] . ..
the role of the Attorney General in the matter [is] minimal, [so] the main generating
force must be private suits .... ,244
A similar problem arises with the State Attorney General's ability to enforce
the ADA. In People ex rel. Vacco v. Mid Hudson Medical Center, a case of first
impression, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
ruled that the State of New York, in the person of its Attorney General, had parens
patriae standing to sue a medical clinic when the clinic refused to provide Deaf
patients with sign language interpreters in violation of the ADA.245 Such standing
required an examination of whether New York was more than a nominal party to
the suit and had a quasi-sovereign interest in pursuing the litigation; whether the
complainants affected by the defendant's conduct represented a substantial segment
of the state's population; and whether the individual complainant could get
complete relief in an individual lawsuit. 246 The line of parens patriae standing
239. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT TO ENSURE
NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 480, 490-91, 494 (1996).
240. Id. at ix. According to Colker, "the broad coverage of ADA Title III came at a price .... In
return for a broad list of covered entities, civil rights advocates agreed to a limited set of remedies under
ADA Title I." Colker, supra note 102, at 377-78. Stating that "it is wrong to blame the Justice
Department" for the problems with Title Ill ADA enforcement, Colker argues, "[e]nforcement problems
with Title III exist because of the limited relief available under the statute, coupled with courts' narrow
interpretations of that relief provision." Id. at 381.
241. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
242. 409 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972).
243. Milani, supra note 208, at 106 (citations omitted).
244. 409 U.S. at 211.
245. 877 F. Supp. 143, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The case was not appealed and remains good law in the
district.
246. Id. at 146-49.
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cases relied on by the District Court in the Mid Hudson case compels the State
Attorney General to restrict its cases to those that not only involve a pattern and
practice of discrimination involving a substantial state interest, but also those that
affect a discrete class of state residents.
247
In addition, the Mid Hudson case is instructive in the ways of political
orientation and power. The suit was brought under a Democratic Attorney General,
G. Oliver Koppell,248 who made it clear to this author that he wanted the Civil
Rights Bureau to take a very aggressive stand against those who violated the ADA
and other civil rights statutes. Koppel approved the lawsuit against the medical
clinic, including demands for $200,000 in compensatory damages and a five-year
monitoring plan.249 However, while the suit was pending, Koppel lost the
Democratic primary, 250 and Dennis Vacco, the Republican candidate, won the
general election.251 Vacco, who verbalized very different ideas about civil rights,
ordered the Civil Rights Bureau's settlement offer of $200,000 to be drastically
reduced to $25,000 and the five-year monitoring plan slashed to two years. 52 In the
247. Id. at 146-48. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)
(noting that the state "must express a quasi-sovereign interest" in protecting the health and well-being of
its residents or in preventing discriminatory denial of "rightful status" in parens patriae actions); see
also People ex rel. Abrams v. II Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1982) (New York had
standing to sue in parens patriae for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 on behalf of the mentally disabled),
modified on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22, 24 (1983) (en banc)); Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306,
310, 314-19 (3d Cir.1981) (State had parens patriae standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf
of victims of police misconduct); People ex rel. Abrams v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, No. 92 CIV.
4884(RJW), 1993 WL 405433, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1993) (New York "has parens patriae
standing to redress conspiratorial civil rights violations directed against its citizens" by seeking an
injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to prohibit extremists from accosting Govenor Clinton during the
1992 Dem. Nat'l Convention); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford,
799 F. Supp. 272, 279 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (New York had standing to sue in parens patriae for persons
with AIDS under the Fair Housing Act). In each of these cases the statute under which the attorneys
general sued did not specifically grant them standing. As an Assistant Attorney General in the Civil
Rights Bureau of the New York State Department of Law, the first question the author always had to ask
when considering a civil rights complaint, including those brought under the ADA, was whether the
complained-of conduct constituted a pervasive pattern or practice of discrimination that affected a broad
class of New York residents, and whether the defendant was large enough to affect that class of people.
248. Mid Hudson, 877 F. Supp. at 144. The author was the Assistant Attorney General who brought
the action and argued against defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. See id., 877 F. Supp. at
144 (listing Michael A. Schwartz as one of the Assistant Attorneys General who brought suit against
Mid Hudson).
249. See Complaint at 7-10, People ex rel. Koppell v. Mid Hudson Med. Group, 877 F. Supp. 143,
145 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (No. 94 Civ. 4688) (requesting claims for relief).
250. Francis X. Clines, The 1994 Campaign: Attorney General; After Hard Race, Burstein Plunges
Into Attacks on Republican Rival, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at B6. Attorney General Koppell lost the
September 1994 primary. The Court decided Mid Hudson in February 1995. 877 F. Supp. at 143.
251. Maria Newman, The 1994 Elections: New York State Attorney General; Vacco Comes From
Behind To Win Against Burstein, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1994, at B9.
252. Consent Judgment at 12, People ex rel. Vaco v. Mid Hudson Medical Group, 877 F. Supp. 143,
145 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (No. 94 Civ. 4588).
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years since 1995, when the case settled by consent decree, the New York State
Attorney General has brought very few lawsuits on behalf of people with
disabilities, let alone Deaf patients in the medical setting.253
D. The Courts Should Adopt an Allocation of Burden Analysis that Requires a
Defendant to Rebut a Presumption of Standing for Plaintiff
This article proposes a resolution of the question of standing that allows
people with disabilities their day in court without requiring an intent to return to the
offending facility in order to qualify for standing. 4 Instead of focusing on whether
a past incident of discrimination is likely to recur in the future, the courts can turn
to an old mechanism very familiar to them: the allocation of the burden of proof.
When a plaintiff with a disability files a complaint in federal court, alleging that a
defendant violated Title III of the ADA by failing or refusing to provide an
appropriate auxiliary aid or service, the allocation of the burden of proof requires
the plaintiff to bear the initial burden of establishing the elements of his or her
255claim. Once the plaintiff has done so, the burden shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate a lawful basis for its actions. 6
Something else should happen at this juncture. A presumption should
immediately arise that the defendant's failure or refusal to provide an appropriate
auxiliary aid or service indicates an on-going violation of the ADA's mandate for
effective communication access. 257 In other words, the failure or refusal to provide
253. A search of the New York State Attorney General's Office website uncovered only two actions
against medical providers on behalf of Deaf patients. Both actions were settled by consent decrees in
2000. Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Spitzer Announces Agreement with Upstate
Physician's Practice to Provide Sign Language Interpreters for Deaf Patients (June 21, 2000),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2000/un/jun2 I-00.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008); Press Release,
Office of the N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Agreement Provides Hospital Interpreters for Deaf: Spitzer Seeks
Compliance with Americans with Disabilities Act (May 2, 2000),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2000/may/may02a_00.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
254. Elizabeth Markey proposes a two-part standard for standing: first, "courts should focus on
defendant's conduct and the likelihood that, were plaintiff to return, he or she would again face
discrimination." Markey, supra note 11, at 211. Whether the plaintiff would return or not would take a
secondary role in the analysis of real and imminent future harm. Id. The second part of the standard
would have "courts . .. consider[ing] the plaintiff's relationship with the defendant, and to this end
should take into account the type of relationship, the length of the relationship, and the frequency of
plaintiff's visits to the public accommodation." Id. Thus, the inquiry into standing would be on a case-
by-case basis, first examining the defendant's conduct, and if it appears that the alleged discrimination is
an on-going occurrence, examining the relationship between the parties to determine if standing is
appropriate Id. Markey's proposal admittedly still allows judges to impose on plaintiffs with disabilities
the heavy burden of demonstrating a likelihood of returning to the public accommodation. Id. at 212. It
still allows a court to deprive a plaintiff of standing if the plaintiff does not show intent to return. Id.
255. See, e.g., Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1166 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
256. Id.
257. See FED. R. EvID. 301 ("Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and Proceedings. In all civil
actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption
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what was necessary for effective communication did not just happen in isolation or
at random; the defendant's failure or refusal should be placed in a historical context
of communication inaccessibility. For decades, the medical setting as well as
countless other venues of public accommodations have been virtually
incommunicado for Deaf people.258 Indeed, for the courts such as the court in
Constance to be oblivious or neglectful of this history only compounds the harm
that the ADA attempts to address.259
Once the plaintiff established that no appropriate auxiliary aids were made
available, the defendant would have to assert an affirmative defense such as a
fundamental alteration of services, a safety issue, or an undue financial burden; or,
in the alternative, demonstrate that the violation has abated and the defendant is in
compliance with the law. 260 The burden would then shift back to plaintiff to show
pretext. Such a presumption would be limited in scope and purpose-it would
simply require the defendant to either offer a legitimate explanation or show the
problem has been fixed. The burden of persuading the fact-finder that the defendant
violated the law still remains on the plaintiff.261
The equities of justice support the imposition of a presumption of standing.
As the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence observes about
presumptions:
The same considerations of fairness, policy, and probability which
dictate the allocation of the burden of the various elements of a case as
between the prima facie case of a plaintiff and affirmative defenses also
imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or
meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.").
258. See generally Harmer, supra note 9, at 74; LaVigne & Vemon, supra note 9, at 847-48.
259. See Constance v. State Univ. of N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr., 166 F. Supp. 2d 663, 667 (N.D.N.Y.
2001); Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 784 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (noting that none of the evidence
before the Court suggests that the plaintiff faces a real and immediate threat of future discrimination).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (2000). It would be quite rare, if not unlikely, that the provision of
sign language interpreters or even CART technology would work a fundamental alteration to the
services or programs of a medical provider, or would impose a financial burden. See, e.g., N.J. Office of
the Att'y Gen., Division on Civil Rights, Ensuring Open and Effective Communication in Hospitals for
Persons Who are Deaf or Hard of Hearing Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.nj.gov/lps/dcr/downloads/dcr._hospital-fact-sheet.pdf (suggesting that sign language
interpreters and CART technology are reasonable accommodations for Deaf and hard of hearing
people). It would be even rarer to successfully demonstrate that the auxiliary aid posed a problem of
safety to plaintiff, defendant or others.
261. See FED R. EVID. 301; JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
MANUAL § 5.02 (2007) (clarifying the distinction between burdens of production and burdens of proof
in civil cases). Rule 301 adopts the Thayer, or "bursting bubble," approach to presumptions. Nunley v.
City of Los Angeles, 52 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The "bursting bubble"
characterizes what happens if a defendant offers evidence to rebut the presumption: the presumption
disappears, although the evidence presented in support of the presumption remains. E.g., Retail Serv.,
Inc. v. Freebies Publ'g, 364 F.3d 535, 542-43 (4th Cir. 2004).
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underlie the creation of presumptions. Those considerations are not
satisfied by giving a lesser effect to presumptions.
262
First, the focus is on the defendant's conduct rather than the plaintiffs intent
to return. The problem of communication inaccessibility has been well-recorded,263
and the courts should not employ an analysis that enables defendants to evade their
responsibilities under the law because the plaintiff does not want to, or cannot,
return to the defendant's office. Permitting such an evasion defeats the intentions of
the statute.
Presuming the existence of a future recurrence based on a single past incident
of discrimination advances the policy goals of the ADA, one of which is to
eliminate discrimination in places of public accommodation.264 Whether or not the
plaintiff intends to return is immaterial. Such an approach is consistent with the
goals of the ADA and in line with Congress's determination "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.
' 265
262. FED.R. EvID. 301 advisory committee's note.
263. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 149-58; cases cited supra note 1.
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(b) (2000) ("It is the purpose of [the ADA] (1) to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established [by the ADA] on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and (4) to
invoke the sweep of congressional authority ... to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-
to-day by people with disabilities.").
265. Id. § 12101(b)(l). Professor Colker takes a different approach. She proposes that "Congress
should enhance DOJ enforcement authority to increase compliance with Title III," and that "not only do
states need to enhance the relief available under their statutes, but they need to revisit the scope of
protection generally provided under state law in the area of disability discrimination." Colker, supra
note 102, at 411. To attain uniform enforcement of disability discrimination law, Colker argues, "we
should move toward a compensatory damage scheme under ADA Title I11, borrowing from the damages
scheme available under the [Fair Housing Act]." Id. This would require businesses that violate the ADA
prior to the lawsuit to pay compensatory damages based on the number of years not in compliance. Id. at
411-12. This ought to serve as a cash incentive for American businesses to enter into compliance since
it would be more cost effective to do so than to be liable for accruing costs for remaining in violation of
the law. Id. However, Colker's proposal would involve a legislative amendment, a risky business given
the current climate in the United States with respect to disability rights. See Mary Johnson, Before Its
Time: Public Perception of Disability Rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Future of
Access and Accommodation, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 121, 124-29 (2007). Johnson's main point is
that American society does not understand the rationale and goals of the ADA, a statute that was enacted
without public awareness and debate, unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which followed decades, even
centuries of hatred and violence against Black Americans. Id. at 121. To Johnson, "critics of the ADA
have successfully cast people who use the law as malcontents who hurt the rest of us. And many
Americans have fallen for the argument that there are 'disabled people' and 'the rest of us'--the former
divided into the truly disabled (read: deserving but few) and the fakers." Id. at 149. As Johnson and
Colker outline, there was a Herculean struggle by the drafters of the ADA to surmount considerable
opposition to the ADA. See id. at 129-37; Colkersupra note 102, at 383-85. There has been a great deal
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Finally, medical providers have the resources, knowledge, and power to make
changes to their behavior that will bring them into compliance with the law's clear
mandates that have been in place for over fifteen years. These providers have had
ample time to bring their policies and practices into compliance with the law, and
they should not benefit from an analysis that shifts the focus from their behavior to
the intentions of the patients.
In short, a basic set of facts-the absence of appropriate auxiliary aids and
services-should give rise to a rebuttable presumption-namely, the absence of
appropriate auxiliary aids reflects an on-going problem of accessibility that should
and could underwrite a Deaf plaintiff-patient's standing to press a claim under the
ADA. The burden is then on the medical provider to assert a legitimate reason,
explanation or defense; or otherwise prove that the policy has been changed. The
policy promoted by such a presumption is the efficient enforcement of an important
civil rights law on behalf of a discrete group that has historically experienced
discrimination. Moreover, the medical provider has superior access to the evidence
and is in a position to enunciate a defense-whatever that defense may be-to the
accusation of communication inaccessibility.
There is nothing revolutionary in the law about this proposition. Take a letter
that has been regularly addressed and mailed-it is presumed that the addressee
received it. If a vehicle is lawfully stopped and struck in the rear by a second
vehicle, it is presumed the driver of the second vehicle was negligent. 266 An
employee driving the employer's vehicle is presumed to be acting within the scope
of employment if he is in an accident. 267 Goods delivered to a bailee in good
condition, if damaged, were presumably damaged because of the bailee's
negligence.268 Similarly, goods damaged during transit by several carriers were
presumed damaged by the last carrier.269 It makes sense from a policy point of
view-the addressee, the second driver, the employee, the bailee, and the last
carrier, respectively, are all actors with superior knowledge or who have easier
access to the evidence.
2 70
If someone dies violently from external means, the presumption is that the
death was accidental and not the result of suicide.27 1 Or someone who has been
of vocal opposition and criticism of the ADA in the national media and proposing a legislative redrafting
of the ADA to strengthen it should be carefully considered. See Johnson, supra, at 129-37.
266. GRAHAM C. LILLY, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 394 (4th ed. 2006). The existence of the basic
fact pattern can be established in a number of ways: pleadings, discovery, a stipulation, trial evidence, or
judicial notice. Id. at 394 n.7.
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absent for seven years without explanation or any communication with family or
friends, and their inquiries turn up nothing-it is presumed the absentee is dead.272
The policy promoted by these presumptions favors the settlement of estates. 273 The
operation of these listed presumptions has a function-to compel the party with the
best knowledge or best access to the proof to come forward, or to promote the
efficient operation of law-and these are the goals accomplished by the
presumption of standing for the plaintiff in a Title III claim against a medical
provider.
The presumption simply allows the Deaf patient-plaintiff the ability to press
on with his or her claim. It shifts the burden of production, not the burden of
persuasion. The plaintiff still must prove all the elements of the case. It does not
guarantee victory in the courtroom. The presumption of standing will support the
Congressional vision articulated in the ADA and restore Deaf patients' trust in the
legal system.
CONCLUSION
One might wonder: if Deaf patients do not want to return to a medical
provider's office because they received a refusal of an appropriate accommodation,
what is the purpose of an injunctive remedy? Wouldn't damages be more effective?
The point of easing the standing bar by decoupling it from the patient's intention
and placing the presumption of an ongoing pattern or practice on the medical
provider is to effectuate the aims of the ADA. By contrast, a rigid reading of the
standing rule shields the medical provider as he or she discriminates against Deaf
274patients. Moreover, if Deaf patients were aware that the burden would be on the
provider to explain why an accommodation was refused, more patients might feel
emboldened to do one of two things: either return to the practice, or press the claim
in order to force compliance for future patients.
Case law underscores the necessity for a statute like the ADA to protect Deaf
patients from discrimination and unequal treatment in the offices of a health care
provider. 275 The doctrine of standing must be reevaluated in light of what we now
know about the experiences of Deaf patients in the medical setting and the ongoing
nature of the doctor's refusal to accommodate them. The narratives of Deaf people
demonstrate a lack of knowledge on the part of some medical personnel about
Deafness and about appropriate behavior toward Deaf people.276 The narratives of
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Markey, supra note 111, at 201-02.
275. See cases cited supra note 1.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 56-77.
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Deaf patients provide powerful evidence that the denial of interpreter services, a
completed harm under the ADA, constitutes an injury-in-fact. 277
The communication-inaccessible milieu of the medical setting, as described
by these patients, establishes a certainty of future injuries sufficient to warrant
injunctive relief regardless of the patients' intention to return. 27 1 Yet, in the
meantime, resistance to paying for appropriate auxiliary aids injures a whole
society "when people with disabilities are excluded from public accommodations
and governmental facilities and services ...[because] non-disabled members of
society are deprived of the benefits of interacting with people with disabilities."2
79
A law may not be able to guarantee what a culture will not give, 280 but it ought to
lead the way.
277. See cases cited supra note 1.
278. See supra Part I.C.
279. Milani, supra note 208, at 104.
280. Johnson, supra note265, at 145-48.
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